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National cybersecurity plays a crucial role in protecting our critical
infrastructure, such as telecommunication networks, the electricity grid, and even
financial transactions. Most discussions about promoting national cybersecurity
focus on governance structures, international relations, and political science. In
contrast, this Article proposes a different agenda and one that promotes the use
of innovation mechanisms for technological advancement. By promoting
inducements for technological developments, such innovation mechanisms
encourage the advancement of national cybersecurity solutions. In exploring
possible solutions, this Article asks whether the government or markets can
provide national cybersecurity innovation. This inquiry is a fragment of a much
larger literature on various innovation policy options (including patents, prizes,
grants, and research and development tax credits). It requires determining
whether national cybersecurity is a public good and an examination of market
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failure and government failure. Along the way, it draws on a property-liability
rules theoretical framework to argue that the patent system's invention secrecy
restrictions and government patent use are ineffective for national cybersecurity
innovation. On a normative level, the interface between government intervention
and markets presents innovation mechanisms for national cybersecurity. Turning
to prescriptions, expansion of prizes should rapidly promote national
cybersecurity innovation, and reciprocal public-private research and
development interactions should gradually multiply knowledge spillovers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the Stuxnet computer virus caused a sophisticated cyber-attack
against a nuclear power plant in Iran.' This malicious computer virus Stuxnet,
which was found to be conducted with nation-state support, replicated itself in
software, proliferated over computer networks, and comprised systems that
controlled the country's nuclear program.2  This high-profile national
cybersecurity incident caused concern and is notable because Stuxnet could have
been adapted to attack communications and electronic power infrastructure that
could cripple the U.S.3 Following Stuxnet, in 2012, U.S. Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta warned that the U.S. was vulnerable to a "cyber Pearl Harbor" that
could derail trains, ruin water supplies, and cripple electricity power grids.4 In
2013, U.S. officials claimed that Iranian cyber hackers infiltrated the
computerized controls of a flood-control dam near New York City through a
cellular modem in a retaliatory cyber-attack for the Stuxnet computer virus.5 This
trend of cyber-attacks that impact critical infrastructure has included halting
Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Nix et al., The Law of Cyber-
Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REv. 817, 817, 819-20, 828, 839, 884 (2012) (proposing a new
comprehensive legal framework to more effectively address cyber-attacks, which as an example,
include one against Iran's nuclear program by the Stuxnet computer worm that was claimed to be
tested by the U.S. and Israel).
2 Christopher S. Yoo, Cyber Espionage or Cyber War?: International Law, Domestic Law,
and Self-Protective Measures, in CYBER WAR (Jens David Ohlinet et al. eds., 2015); David
Kushner, The Real Story of Stuxnet, IEEE SPECTRUM, Mar. 2013, at 49, 50 (describing the
malicious computer code's infiltration of Iran's nuclear fuel enrichment program).
3 Carol M. Hayes & Jay P. Kesan, Law of Cyber War, INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA DIGIT. COMMC'N
& SoC'Y 1, 12 (2015).
4 SEAN T. LAWSON, CYBERSECURITY DISCOURSE IN THE UNITED STATES 1918, 1953 (Taylor &
Francis ed. 2019); Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. ILL.
J.L. TECH. & PoL'Y 341, 347.
5 See Robert M. Lee, Protecting Industrial Control System in Critical Infrastructure, in
CYBER INSECURITY 31-32 (Rowman & Littlefield ed. 2016) (suggesting that Iranian cyber-
attackers, who were sanctioned by the Iranian government targeted U.S. infrastructure in response
to the Stuxnet worm launched previously against Iran, attempted to gain access to a 245 feet tall
and 800 feet wide dam that could have resulted in deaths of thousands of New York residents, but
were stopped by the U.S. intelligence community).
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operations of a German steel mill in 2014,6 leaving thousands without electricity
from shut-down utility operations in Ukraine in 2015,7 and grounding airplanes
in Poland in 2015.8 Nation-states have begun to engage in cyber warfare, and
national cybersecurity is an increasing concern and considered the next threat to
national security and for critical infrastructure.' Computer-induced failures of
U.S. power grids, transportation networks, and financial systems could cause
massive physical damage, take down the stock exchange and the Internet, and
disrupt the nation's economy.10
Nation-state warfare, which began on the ground between soldiers and
transitioned to ships at sea and planes in the sky, now has shifted to computers
and software." Military battles between nations are no longer limited to
mechanical, chemical, and nuclear weapons but instead, must consider computer
and software weapons that could cripple infrastructure once considered
invulnerable to digital attacks.12 Critical infrastructure, which includes
communication systems, electricity grids, and transportation networks, are
becoming more complex and reliant on connected devices and data transmission,
6 Scott J. Shackelford, Smart Factories, Dumb Policy?: Managing Cybersecurity and Data
Privacy Risks in the Industrial Internet of Things, 21 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 3 (2019).
Scott J. Shackelford, Michael Sulmeyer, Amanda N. Craig Deckard, Ben Buchanan et al.,
From Russia with Love: Understanding the Russian Cyber Threat to U.S. Critical Infrastructure
and What To Do About It, 96 NEB. L. REV. 320, 321, 324-38 (2017); Donghui Park, Julia Summer
& Michael Walstrom, Cyberattack on Critical Infrastructure: Russia and the Ukranian Power
Grid Attacks, HENRY M. JACKSON SCH. INT'L STUDS. (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://jsis.washington.edu/news/cyberattack-critical-infrastructure-russia-ukrainian-power-grid-
attacks/.
8 Hackers Ground 1,400 Passengers in Attack on Polis Airline LOT (Update), PHYS.ORG
(June 21, 2015), https://phys.org/news/2015-06-airline-cancels-flights-hacker.html.
9 See generally RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT
TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 100-01 (Harper Collins ed. 2010) (suggesting
that cyberwar is the next great threat to national security, which cause power grids and critical
systems to shut down).
10 ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, CYBER WARFARE: A "NUCLEAR OPTION"? 4 (2012).
11 Bradley Raboin, Corresponding Evolution: International Law and the Emergence of Cyber
Warfare, 31 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 603, 603-04 (2011) (describing the evolving
history of war and the recent radical shift to the information age of utilizing emerging computer
technologies for military purposes).
12 KREPINEVICH, supra note 10, at i-iii, 2-4 (suggesting a major shift in military conflict with
expansion into the cyber domain and critical infrastructure more vulnerable to cyber-attacks that
would produce catastrophic destruction); U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM'N, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY i (2020), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ryMCIL-dZ30QyjFqFkkflOMxIXJGT4yv/v




such that vulnerability or failure of a link could result in a devastating chain
reaction and debilitate society.13
Technological innovation is necessary to foster the development of
digital solutions to defend, maintain, and advance critical infrastructure from
cyber-attacks and to present new offensive capabilities to keep pace in cyber
warfare.14 Cybersecurity legal and policy scholarship has emphasized the nature
and function of government and private-sector actors, the role of regulators, and
frameworks for governance and international relations," but technological
innovation has been underappreciated and underdeveloped. Surprisingly little
meaningful cybersecurity scholarship has addressed the crosscutting realities of
technological innovation, yet technology is the underlying force that drives
cybersecurity law and policy.16 Society needs to consider what institution and
policy choices can best foster technological innovation to protect critical
infrastructure.
National cybersecurity involves tradeoffs with government intervention
and market-based incentives for technological innovation, and theoretical
reformulation of innovation mechanisms towards this lens is the subject of this
Article. The patent system has been considered as supporting the establishment
of a market of new technologies by providing incentives for invention, promoting
the financing of innovation, and stimulating competition through exclusion. As
such, while the patent system is a government-driven mechanism, the market
foundation role of patents supports the market development of new technologies.
13 See generally Michael A. Mullane, Cyber Attacks Targeting Critical Infrastructure, IEC E-
TECH (Feb. 15, 2019), https://etech.iec.ch/issue/2019-02/cyber-attacks-targeting-critical-
infrastructure (stating that cyber-attacks on the critical infrastructure could cut off the supply of
electricity to hospitals, homes, schools and factories); Craig Rieger & Milos Manic, On Critical
Infrastructures, Their Security and Resilience,
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1812/1812.02710.pdf (suggesting that the critical infrastructure
is increasingly interconnected and interdependent).
14 DEF. SCi. BD. TASK FORCE ON COMPUT. SEC., SECURITY CONTROLS FOR COMPUTER SYSTEMS
A.1 (1979) (suggesting that security is an increasing concern for military operations); Nat'l Inst.
of Standards & Tech., Smart Grid Cybersecurity Strategy, Architecture, and High-Level
Requirements, in GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID CYBERSECURITY ix, xi (2014) (specifying that
advancements in information technologies are essential to building a reliable smart grid).
IS Martha Finnemore & Duncan B. Hollis, Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity, 110
AM. J. INT'L L. 425, 431 (2016) (defining cybersecurity as "the protection of information and
communication technologies from unauthorized access and attempted access").
16 See INT'L TELECOMM. UNION, SERIES X: DATA NETWORKS, OPEN SYSTEM COMMUNICATIONS
AND SECURITY 2 (2008) (providing as a defmition: "Cybersecurity is the collection of tools,
policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions,
training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber
environment and organization and user assets. Organization and user assets include connected
computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunication systems,
and the totality of transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber environment. Cybersecurity
strives to ensure that the attainment and maintenance of the security properties of the organization
and user's assets against relevant security risks in the cyber environment").
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The parsing out of the government's need to provide national cybersecurity
versus the private market in being able to provide national cybersecurity raises
the question as to whether the patent system provides sufficient incentives for
national cybersecurity innovation. A variety of innovation mechanisms could
promote national cybersecurity innovation, and a comparison of the role of
government and the market presents innovation policy considerations for society.
Implicit in this analysis is that the patent system has some role in
technological advancement for national cybersecurity. However, inventors and
patent holders lack inadequate incentives from the patent system for national
cybersecurity inventions, for which the guarantee of the reward is too small, the
possibility of the reward is uncertain, or the transaction cost is too high. As a
result, the patent system is inadequate to promote national cybersecurity
innovation. Such limitations may push some national cybersecurity innovators
towards trade secrecy, which presents a different set of problems, including
whether and how they can help foster technological advancement o protect the
critical infrastructure. The purpose of this Article is to assess how important the
patent system is to national cybersecurity. If one unequivocal conclusion follows
from this Article in addressing this tradeoff for achieving national cybersecurity,
it is that patents may not be a good match when their disclosure is kept secret or
when their interests can be taken by government, and technological innovation
for critical infrastructure protection can be better oriented through prize funding
or a better way to encourage public-private research and development ("R&D").
Innovation mechanisms for technological advancement present unique
challenges for national cybersecurity, including market failure, government
failure, and co-mingled public-private infrastructure elements. At a theoretical
economic level, inventors and innovators will not make investments in national
cybersecurity R&D and individuals hope to reap its benefits without contribution
to its technology development-a conundrum that warrants government
intervention."
In exploring national cybersecurity innovation, this Article highlights
and challenges the particularized, traditional conception of national security
innovation embedded in the patent system. Among other characteristics,
innovation in patent law for the national security context prohibits disclosure on
inventions, allows for eminent domain power with government patent use, and
protects government from patent infringement causes of action. National
cybersecurity innovation, however, should arise from government and private
sector collaboration (rather than solely market forces such as through the patent
system) and emerge from non-patent incentives. This Article further argues that,
notwithstanding patent law's particular conception of innovation, these
dynamics often apply as well to technological domains where the innovation
produces significant positive externalities beyond the implementing firm (such
17 Paul Rosenzweig, Cybersecurity and Public Goods: The Public/Private "Partnership",
TASK FORCE ON NAT'L SEC. & L. 7,7-8 (2011).
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as for environmental, public health, and public safety). Along these lines, the
analysis reveals previously unrecognized benefits of public finance mechanisms,
particularly prizes and Cooperative Research and Development Agreements
("CRADAs") for national cybersecurity innovation.
Before proceeding, several terminological notes are in order. First, this
Article focuses on "national cybersecurity" rather than "corporate
cybersecurity." While it certainly addresses corporate cybersecurity (and the
corporate enterprises that seek cybersecurity solutions) and recognizes that
interconnectedness of corporate insecurity affects national cybersecurity,sis
emphasis on national cybersecurity innovation offers a mechanism to serve
public objectives. Second, although this Article focuses on "national
cybersecurity innovation," it posits no sharp distinction between the field of
cybersecurity and the more traditional forms of information security.19 Indeed, it
argues that labels signifying "cyber" and "information" reflect differences of
emphasis and degree of new forms of cyber-physical interconnectedness rather
than fundamental differences of kind, and therefore, the underlying innovation
dynamics are often generalizable across overlapping contexts. Third, this Article
uses the term "innovation" rather than the term "invention" to describe the novel
creations that serve societal public needs and not solely market needs.20 Thus,
the term "invention" has limited meaning in the national cybersecurity
innovation context, other than for technologies subject to the Invention Secrecy
Act or subject government patent use and government exemption from patent
infringement under 28 U.S.C. § 1498-each of which this Article argues against
and considers a particularized, traditional conception.
Turning from the descriptive to the normative and prescriptive, this
Article proposes mechanisms for accelerating national cybersecurity innovation.
In so doing, it helps fill a significant gap on technological innovation in the
cybersecurity literature, for,
[while] [c]omputers and networks essentially run the critical
infrastructures that are vital to our national defense, economic
security, and public health and safety, [u]nfortunately, many
18 Gabriele Lattanzio & Yue Ma, Corporate Innovation in the Cyber Age, 1-3 (SMU Cox Sch.
of Bus., Research Paper No.20-04, 2020).
19 See generally Ross ANDERSON, SECURITY ENGINEERING (Wiley ed. 2008) (describing the
differences between various forms of security in describing specialized protection mechanisms and
how to build systems that stay dependable); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, CYBER!, 2017 BYU L. REv.
1109, 1113 (2018) (distinguishing between cybersecurity and information security).
20 Traditional patent parlance distinguishes between "invention," which refers to creating a
new technology applicable for market need, and of "innovation," which entails the technological
development and commercialization processes a technology that could serve broader societal
public needs as well. Kim Bhasin, This Is the Difference Between "Invention " and "Innovation ",
Bus. INSIDER (Apr. 2, 2012, 3:46 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/this-is-the-difference-
between-invention-and-innovation-2012-4 ("If invention is a pebble tossed in the pond, innovation
is the rippling effect that the pebble causes.").
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computer systems and networks were not designed with security
in mind, [and] as a result, the core of our critical infrastructure
is riddled with vulnerabilities that could enable an attacker to
disrupt operations or cause damage to these infrastructures.
21
In drawing upon a rich body of scholarship comparing the relative merits of
patents, grants, prizes, R&D tax credits, and other inducement mechanisms to
promote national cybersecurity innovation, this Article argues against extending
exclusive patent rights to national cybersecurity innovations and applies several
economic and theoretical insights for promoting such innovation. It draws upon
the theoretical Calabresi-Melamed typology of property rules and liability rules
to serve as a guidepost for examining why the patent system inadequately
incentivizes national cybersecurity innovation.
The normative vision rooted in this Article for national cybersecurity
innovation is that the current patent system is slow and hampers innovation,
whereas prizes rapidly place an invention into the public domain without possible
significant deadweight losses, and reciprocal public-private R&D interactions in
the form of a CRADA can recalibrate the patent bargain. While there are some
benefits with other innovation mechanisms-such as basic research at
universities, applied research and commercialization non-profit organizations,
small business innovation funding, and public subsidies (research grants and tax
incentives)--this Article argues that national cybersecurity innovation is best
achieved via government intervention through prizes and CRADAs. In
particular, it argues that national cybersecurity is a public good and that public
funding can quickly promote and steer national cybersecurity innovation, while
recognizing biases and information costs raised by public choice theory. In
reciprocal fashion, this Article shows that national cybersecurity innovation has
much to teach legal scholars and policymakers about accelerating more
traditional types of technological innovation. In particular, it argues that
innovation policy should focus more on fostering public finance innovation
mechanisms for technological areas serving societal public needs (such as
national cybersecurity, environmental public health, and public safety) and
providing reciprocal public-private enhancing interactions for the rapid
development of technologies that co-mingle private and public infrastructure
elements.
This Article develops analysis and arguments grounded in theory and
proceeds in four parts. Part II summarizes the contours of national cybersecurity
technology (including through graphical representations), identifies the problem
and need for protection of critical infrastructure, and assesses the problem and
need in preparedness of national cybersecurity to defend against cyber-attacks
and foster the development of new technologies. Part III turns to theory to serve
21 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: CYBERSECURITY FOR CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (2004), https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/157541.pdf.
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as a foundation for delineating the appropriate scope of government invention in
the national cybersecurity domain. It explores whether national cybersecurity is
a public good in the economic sense and how it compares to a public good in the
patent law context to conclude that mischaracterization can lead to government
failure or market failure. Moreover, it considers the theoretical Calabresi-
Melamed typology of property rules and liability rules to argue against the patent
system for incentivizing national cybersecurity innovation. It argues that
technological co-mingling of critical infrastructure necessitates integration of
public and private inducements for innovation. Part IV draws on theories from
Part III to assess normative implications, costs, and benefits of various incentive
mechanisms for national cybersecurity development. Turning to prescriptions, it
argues that prizes should incentivize rapid cybersecurity development and
CRADAs should gradually multiply knowledge spillovers with reciprocal
public-private R&D interactions. Part V concludes, including a discussion on
innovation policy and on cybersecurity scholarship.
II. CHARACTERIZING CYBERSECURITY FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Cyber-attacks involve more than theft of corporate information; they can
damage or destroy critical infrastructure, which in turn, can lead to a catastrophic
shutdown of society. The threat of cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure
deserves special attention in cybersecurity scholarship and requires some
foundational background, including defmitions and descriptions, the problem
and need, and the role of innovation mechanisms in creating a state of
preparedness or lack thereof.
A. Defining & Describing "National Cybersecurity"
What exactly is "national cybersecurity," or "cybersecurity" for that
matter? A part of the challenge of analyzing national cybersecurity (or, in
general, cybersecurity) entails defining what that term means and its boundaries.
Various definitions abound about the term "cybersecurity," which in isolation
can be so capacious as to encompass fields as diverse as corporate cybersecurity,
information (data) security, and national security. Scholars have pointed out that
there is not a crisp definition of cybersecurity.2 2
22 JEFF KOSSEFF, CYBERSECURITY LAW xxiv-xxv (2020) ("Cybersecurity encompasses all of
those subjects [data security, anti-hacking, privacy] and more. . . .and cybersecurity law [consists]
of six broad areas of law: private sector data security laws, anti-hacking laws, public-private
cybersecurity efforts, government surveillance laws, cybersecurity requirements for government
contractors, privacy law"); Lawrence J. Trautman, Congressional Cybersecurity Oversight: Who 's
Who and How It Works, J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 1, 5 (2015) (stating "[t]he terms cybersecurity
and cyberattack have become broadly used without widespread acceptance as to their exact
meaning"); What Is Cybersecurity and What Does It Mean for You?, GET SMARTER (Feb. 13,
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As Professor Andrea Matwyshyn has noted, legal scholarship and policy
has become "cyberized" to the point that the "current rhetoric is so muddled."
2 3
Professor John Bagby conceptualizes security in the cyber or digital context as
connoting "the quality or state of being secure, freedom from danger, fear, or
anxiety [which] includes undertakings to guard against various threats," which
he states can be termed "computer security, cybersecurity, network security,
cloud security, critical infrastructure (security) protections, and national security
and the like." 2 4 Even if there are various definitions, Professor Orin Kerr has
noted that "there isn't much clarity about what 'cybersecurity' law actually
means" but acknowledges that one set of special issues concerns "government
network offense and defense."2 5 Professor Jeff Kosseff has determined that not
only has legal scholarship not coalesced around a definition for cybersecurity
law but that cybersecurity legislation provisions have failed to define
cybersecurity.26 Despite the lack of a uniformly agreed upon definition of
"cybersecurity" among cybersecurity law scholars, it does not lessen the fact the
technology is at the core of cybersecurity law and policy as Professor Scott
Shackelford has noted, stating, "[d]ifficulties stem in part from the rate of
technological advancement .. . [and] [i]nformation technology is no exception
[since] [n]etworked computers have given tremendous advantages to and
exposed vulnerabilities of the cyber power[]."27 "Technology has raced ahead of
both military doctrine and international law." 28
Rather than offer a categorical definition, this Section contends that the
"national" nature of "national cybersecurity" suggests protection that impacts the
nation and serves public interest. Thus, the field of cybersecurity represents a
continuum, which includes national cybersecurity that serves public interests and
corporate cybersecurity that serves private interests. However, national
cybersecurity is connected with corporate cybersecurity, since the critical
infrastructure occupies the boundary between the private sector's responsibilities
2019), https://www.getsmarter.com/blog/career-advice/what-is-cybersecurity-and-what-does-it-
mean-for-you/.
23 Matwyshyn, supra note 19, at 1114.
24 John W. Bagby, Security Law, Regulation and Public Policy for Accounting Professionals
3-4 (Aug. 11, 2018) (on file with author).




26 Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IowA L. REv. 985, 988 (2018) (stating that
"the U.S. legal system lacks a consistent definition of the term 'cybersecurity law' [and that] no
scholarship has stepped back to define exactly what 'cybersecurity law' is and the goals of statutes
and regulations that aim to promote 'cybersecurity"').
27 SCorr J. SHACKELFORD, MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUSINESS,




and the government's national security responsibilities.29 There is a reciprocal
security relationship between the public and private sectors that are "inextricably
interwoven."3 0 Along these lines, corporate cybersecurity is not necessarily
incompatible with national cybersecurity since the private sector owns, operates,
and maintains approximately 85% of the critical infrastructure (with the
remaining 15% owned by the government).31 Information (data) security refers
to the information and communication technologies that underlie any type of
cybersecurity.32 The following Venn diagram provides a taxonomy of these
various terms, and the scope of cybersecurity.
cybe security national security
expanding scope of cyberspace
information security
ICT
expanding scope of ICT
Figure 1: Taxonomy of Security Technologies
This Article characterizes national cybersecurity innovations based on
the degree to which they substantially serve the public interest and produce
changes in national security. This characterization considers cybersecurity as a
subset of national security and information security as being comprised of
information and communications technologies ("ICT") which is the underlying
technology of cybersecurity. The reciprocal relationship between corporate
cybersecurity and national cybersecurity is shown in Figure 1 graphically as
simply "cybersecurity," which comprises both private sector owned
29 John W. Bagby, Cyber-Infrastructure Protection Policy: On resolving Ostensibly Intractable
Posistions 1, 6 (Jan. 16, 2013) (on file with author).
30 Matwyshyn, supra note 19, at 1114, 1116-17, 1119, 1121, 1126-27.
31 Bagby, supra note 29, at 4.
32 Kosseff, supra note 26, at 995.
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cybersecurity and government owned cybersecurity.
33 As shown by the arrows
in Figure 1, with an expanding scope of cyber space (including cyber-physical
systems3 4) and an expanding scope of ICT (including the Internet of Things, or
the IoT35), the field of cybersecurity will begin to encompass national security.
36
Lack of cybersecurity is the new national security threat.
37 In sum, Figure 1
demonstrates that ICT is an increasing part of each of information security,
cybersecurity, and national security. Additionally, as cyberspace expands,
cybersecurity will become synonymous with national security.
As a result of an expansive scope of corporate (privately-owned)
cybersecurity technologies, vulnerabilities in software and the security
ecosystem have a reciprocal and inextricably interwoven nature that couples the
private sector with the public sector,
38  thereby implicating national
cybersecurity. This Article characterizes national cybersecurity based on the
degree that it serves critical infrastructure
39 and as being co-mingled of private
33 As shown in Figure 1, the term "cybersecurity" refers to a broad approach captured by
various technologies that enable and promote a protected, reliable, and stable national critical
infrastructure. Underlying this graphical representation is the understanding that "national
cybersecurity" has both public sector and private sector elements, whereas "corporate
cybersecurity" has purely private sector elements. More specifically, the private sector measures
in the form of corporate cybersecurity have the potential to impact public sector critical
infrastructure in the form of national cybersecurity. In particular, effective corporate cybersecurity
can led to stronger national cybersecurity, in part due to the interconnectedness; in turn, corporate
cybersecurity affects national security.
34 See infra note 78.
3s See id
36 In other words, Figure 1 demonstrates that national cybersecurity can be conceptualized as
an expansive cybersecurity (including expansive corporate cybersecurity), which implicates
increasing aspects of national security.
3? J. Benton Heath, The New National Security Challenge to the Economic Order, 129 Yale
L.J. 1020, 1024, 1034 (2020).
38 Johnathan Pincus, Sarah Blakinship & Thomasz Ostwald, Looking at Information Security
Through an Interdisciplinary Lens, in HARBORING DATA 19, 26-27 (Andrea M. Matswyshyn ed.,
Standford Univ. Press ed. 2009) (describing a vulnerability as "any flaw within a software system
that can cause it to work contrary to its documented design and could be exploited to cause the
system to violate its documented security policy" and the security ecosystem as "organizations and
individuals around the world with a stake in information security: corporations, governments,
individual security researchers, information brokers, bot herders, and so on"); Matwyshyn, supra
note 19, at 1109, 1113-14, 1116-17.
39 42 U.S.C.A. § 5195c(e) (West 2020); BOBBY CHESNEY, CHESNEY ON CYBERSECURITY LAW,
POLICY, AND INSTITUTIONS 81-82 (2020) (ebook) (characterizing critical infrastructure as
"provid[ing] the essential services that underpin American society and serve as the backbone of
our nation's economy, security, and health ... [known] as the power we use in our homes, the
water we drink, the transportation that moves us, the stores we shop in, and the communication
systems we rely on to stay in touch with friends and family." Further listing distinct sectors of
critical infrastructure as being: chemical sector, commercial facilities sector, communications
sector, critical manufacturing sector, dams sector, defense industrial base sector, emergency
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and public sectors elements.40 The interplay between national cybersecurity's
private sector and public sector stems from the characteristics of ICT.41
Characterizing national cybersecurity in this manner helps to show the
interconnected nature of the private-public sectors that are necessary for
innovation applicable for critical infrastructure.
1. Securing the Critical Infrastructure
This Article characterizes national cybersecurity innovations based on
the degree to which they substantively serve critical infrastructure and produce
changes in the level of security from cyber-attacks. Innovations that are
intertwined with critical infrastructure impact modern business practice and
national security.42 This sense of technological security of national cybersecurity
is not a dichotomy of security or insecurity alone, but instead it is a sliding scale
and spectrum with a range of level of security.43 Moreover, there are varied types
critical infrastructure, which are regulated differently and present a continuum
of systemic vulnerability to cyber-attacks.44 Even with a sliding scale of
technological security and a continuum of critical infrastructure, a common
theme in achieving national cybersecurity is to attain information assurance with
network defense.45 Thus, national cybersecurity technologies promote links and
network effects among computer systems that distribute data and share
information among multiple dimensions of critical infrastructure. These effects
have private sector and public sector elements.
First, national cybersecurity inventions can be secure (or insecure)
through links between software, devices, and the nation's critical infrastructure.46
services sector, energy sector, financial services sector, food and agriculture sector, government
facilities sector, healthcare and public health sector, information technology sector, nuclear
reactors/materials/waste sector, transportation systems sector, water and wastewater systems
sector).
40 Matwyshyn, supra note 19, at 1121.
41 See Melissa E. Hathaway & Alexander Klimburg, Preliminary Considerations: On National
Cyber Security, in NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY FRAMEwoRK MANUAL 1, 1-2 (Alexander Klimburg
ed., 2012).
42 John Bagby & David Reitter, Anticipatory FinTech Regulation: On Deploying Big Data
Analytics to Predict the Direction, Impact and Control of Financial Technology (Oct. 1, 2019)
(available at https://ssm.com/abstract-3456844).
43 Lee, supra note 5, at 33-34.
44 Bagby, supra note 29, at 1-2.
45 Trey Herr & Eric Ormes, Understanding Information Assurance, 10 AM. FOREIGN POL'Y
COUNCIL, Apr. 2015, at 1.
46 Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructure, ALLIANZ GLOB. CORP. & SPECIALTY,
https://www.agcs.allianz.com/news-and-insights/expert-risk-articles/cyber-attacks-on-critical-
infrastructure.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2020) (specifying that "critical infrastructure . .. is
becoming more complex and reliant on networks of connected devices" and that "everyday devices
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National cybersecurity technologies have a direct or indirect impact on physical
hardware, equipment, devices, and software of critical infrastructure. Such
technologies provide security in relation to authentication, covertness, and fault
tolerance through security linking mechanisms through access controls, ciphers,
and hardware tamper-resistance.
47 Digitization provides links between the
physical and cyber worlds, such that the critical infrastructure is exposed to
physical attacks or cyber-attacks.
48 Connectivity, control, and prevention of
attack onto vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure are important in
characterizing a national cybersecurity innovation as being secure. In general,
the primary motivation of national cybersecurity innovation is to secure the
fundamental facilities and systems of our critical infrastructure that serve the
country and are necessary for the operation of the economy.
49 This is a
complicated inquiry, however, because critical infrastructure is composed of
public and private physical improvements, and this co-mingling necessitates a
closer inspection of innovation policy that fosters the development of technology
to provide greater national cybersecurity.
50 Critical infrastructure is composed of
inter-connected government services and a large private sector system, such that
interdependencies stress the role of cybersecurity in nearly all aspects.
51 As a
general matter, however, as Professor Bagby has noted, "critical infrastructure
[protection] stubbornly occupies the boundary between the private-sector's
responsibilities and national security realms [and] private sector risks are often
insurable but national security risks are frequently framed as tantamount to
risking cataclysmic failure."52 National cybersecurity innovation aims to create
national security value rather than market value.
Second, national cybersecurity technologies can be secure (or insecure)
in that they enhance public safety through thwarting deleterious network effects.
Threats in data emerging from the cloud, mobile/wireless, and other computer
systems can transmit vulnerabilities through a variety of data center, routers, and
embedded with electronics that collect information and connect to a network ... could create a
perfect cyber security storm").
47 ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 4.
48 Yagnyasenee Sen Gupta & Shyamapada Mukherjee, A Survey on Security Issues in Cyber-
Physical Systems, PROCS. INT'L CONF. ON COMPUTATIONAL INTEL. & IoT 137, 137-38 (2018)
(describing how links between cyber and physical elements can be provided by actuators and
sensors with communications and software capabilities, and that "physical attacks are the ones that
tamper physical elements" and "cyber-attacks are the ones whose deployment takes place through
software, malware or accessing the communication network in an unauthorized way and thereby
tampering the transmitting data").
49 See sources cited supra note 39.
50 Bagby, supra note 29, at 4; Herr & Ormes, supra note 45, at 9.
51 PETER SOMMER & IAN BROWN, REDUCING SYSTEMIC CYBERSECURITY RISK 23 (2011),
https://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/46889
92 2 .pdf.
52 Bagby, supra note 29, at 6.
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hosts. Such is the case with other interconnected computing approaches that rely
on security to prevent, detect, mitigate, or restore threats and attacks in data
before spreading to the computing system. National cybersecurity is akin to a
chain, such that it is only as strong as the weakest link, and a vulnerability on the
weakest link can spread through communication in networks. Cyberattacks
against networks can be against vulnerabilities in network protocols, on local
networks use Internet protocols, or use malicious code but can be defended
against by filtering and firewalls, intrusion detection, and encryption.5 3 Similarly,
classic data (information) security innovation suggests that threats to physical
facilities of the critical infrastructure occur through random and unauthorized
access to that data and among interconnection of networked devices and
systems.54 Two-way information communication and network effects presents
risks to critical infrastructure.55 Along similar lines as the impact on security via
interconnections between external features with critical infrastructure,
vulnerabilities and security breaches can be multiplied via network effects.
Vulnerabilities in software can impact an entire ecosystem,56 and leakage points
in hardware, software, and communication can exacerbate vulnerabilities.57 The
result is that network effects of insecurity can result in co-mingled, or public and
private, elements.58 The impact to critical infrastructure for public and national
security interests, however, helps distinguish such innovation from other ICT
that may only enhance corporate cybersecurity.
National cybersecurity technologies prevent adversaries from producing
harm (whether intentionally or otherwise) via access, attack, exploit, exposure,
threats, and vulnerability to protect the sovereignty of the state, and its assets,
5 ANDERSON, supra note 47, at 636, 638, 644, 652.
5 Michael E. Whitman & Herbert J. Mattord, Introduction to Information Security, in
PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION SECURITY 6,6-7 (2012).
5 Nat'l Inst. of Standards & Tech., supra note 14, at 1-2 (specifying that additional risks
include: "[i]nterconnected networks [that] introduce common vulnerabilities"; "communication
disruptions and the introduction of malicious software/firmware or compromised hardware" that
results in malicious attacks; "[i]ncreased number of entry points and paths available for potential
adversaries to exploit"; "interconnected systems [that] increase the amount of private information
exposed and increase the risk when data is aggregated"; and "expansion of the amount of data that
will be collected that can lead to the potential for compromise of data confidentiality").
56 See sources cited supra note 38.
57 DEF. SCI. BD. TASK FORCE ON COMPUT. SEC., supra note 14, at 7-8 (defining hardware
leakage points as "hardware portions of the systems [that] are subject to malfunctions that can
result directly in a leak or cause a failure of security protection mechanisms elsewhere in the
system, including a software malfunction"; defining software leakage points as "all vulnerabilities
directly related to the software in the computer system"; defining communication leakage point as
"the communications linking the central processor, the switching center and the remote
terminals").
58 See infra Section 1II.B.1.
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resources, and people.59 These characteristics present links and network effects
that present private sector and public sector dimensions of critical infrastructure
that necessitate a closer inspection of the technologies for its protection and the
concomitant evolution of critical infrastructure.
60
2. Mapping of Critical Infrastructure with Technological Innovation
Perhaps the best way to elucidate national cybersecurity innovation is by
discussing specific examples. Representative examples to defend against cyber-
attacks illustrate the "security" nature of such innovation and provide a basis for
comparison with other cybersecurity innovation. The highly interconnected
nature of the public and private sector elements demands a significant degree of
contextual innovation policy to foster development of such innovations.
61
Furthermore, national cybersecurity innovation is both similar to and
different from other forms of corporate forms of cybersecurity. In corporate
domains, cybersecurity is critical for identity theft prevention, protection of
consumer data, and preventing corporate information leakage and data
breaches.62 For example, Professor Matwyshyn has described the importance of
corporate cybersecurity to businesses by stating that, "[i]n the broader business
context, the business environment in our society has been dramatically altered
by the integration of information technology into corporate governance and
operations over the last two decades. Businesses have become progressively
more technology-centric and, consequently, organized in large part around their
unifying computer systems."63 National cybersecurity innovations are different
in that they protect industrial control systems in critical infrastructure. In this
sense, the motivations of national cybersecurity development are more akin to
environmental innovation and public health innovation, where advancements
serve public interests in order to benefit society broadly rather than solely market
based objectives. As will be shown, however, innovators can seldom develop
national cybersecurity innovation in isolation. Instead, the highly interconnected
nature between corporate cybersecurity and national cybersecurity leads to
effective national security.
In exploring national cybersecurity, it is useful to provide a
representative mapping for the current analysis. Although there are many axes
upon which to order national cybersecurity innovations, two are particularly
useful. The first is the degree to which a technology is connected with a public-
owned (government-owned) versus private-sector-owned part of the critical
59 See Whitman & Mattord, supra note 54, at 8-11.
60 See supra Section II.A.1.
61 See infra Part IV.
62 See generally HARBORING DATA, supra note 38.
63 Andrea M. Matswyshyn, Introduction to HARBORING DATA, supra note 38.
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infrastructure. National cybersecurity innovations run the gamut from large
infrastructures, such as dams and electricity grids that are owned by government,
to privately-owned technologies that interface with such public infrastructure.64
The second is the degree to which a national cybersecurity innovation is oriented
towards cyberspace versus the degree to which it exists in the tangible, physical
world. At one end of this spectrum are data-centric or information technological
innovations that reside in software and do not directly address the physical world,
and at the other end of this spectrum are tangible and physical devices.
The distinctions in this representative mapping matter, since there has
been and continues to be a historical technological shift in protection of critical
infrastructure,65 which is demonstrated in figures that characterize critical
infrastructure in response to national cybersecurity innovation. The
representative mapping shown in the ensuing figures influences how law and







Figure 2.A: Representative mapping of the traditional view of critical
infrastructure
64 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE PHYSICAL
PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY ASSETS vii, xii, 35-70 (2003),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/PhysicalStrategy.pdf.
65 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2021, 49-54
(2020), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/fy_2021_dhsbib_webversion.pdf
(showing a budgetary shift in priority by the U.S. government towards the critical infrastructure).
66 See infra Part IV.
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Figure 2.B: Representative mapping of the evolving view of critical
infrastructure coincident with national cybersecurity innovation
These figures reflect many of the characteristics of national
cybersecurity and their impact on critical infrastructure. They address
technological innovation of ICT that protects critical infrastructure.
67 The nature
of the critical infrastructure which is susceptible to cyber-attacks6 8 is affected by
innovation in interconnected hardware and software,69 with the effect that public-
owned (government-owned) elements are increasingly connected to cyber
technologies through data. And while it is difficult to quantify the degree of this
change, it is fair to say it is largely motivated by advances in information and
communication technologies that detect, prevent, and mitigate cyber risk.
70
Furthermore, these cyber innovations, which are being developed and deployed
by the private sector, increasingly interconnect and link with public-owned
(government-owned) elements of the critical infrastructure.
7 1
These innovations impact national cybersecurity in that they
increasingly cause critical infrastructure to be exposed to cyber-attack.
72 This is
67 See generally Finnemore & Hollis, supra note 15.
68 See generally Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and
Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 429 (2012).
69 DEF. SCI. BD. TASK FORCE ON COMPUT. SEC., supra note 14, at 3-4.
70 NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9 (2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf.
71 See generally Rieger & Manic, supra note 13 (describing the increasing interdependencies
and interconnectedness of the national critical infrastructure).
72 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., CYBER RISK ECONOMICS CAPABILITY GAPS RESEARCH




a vibrant, incredibly valuable area of technological innovation, and yet as is
shown, it proceeds more quickly and efficiently outside of the patent system.7 3
Indeed, the reality of national cybersecurity helps illustrate a narrow and highly
particularized conception of innovation embedded in patent law for national
security that runs counter the incentive-laden goals of the patent system, a unique
phenomenon that the next Part explores further from a theoretical lens.74 Of
course, to say that national cybersecurity innovation is hampered by deficiencies
in the patent system for national security is not to say that all national
cybersecurity innovation should proceed outside of the patent system. Patents
and the market system are a robust source of corporate cybersecurity, and
national cybersecurity melds some corporate cybersecurity with public-owned
(government-owned) elements of critical infrastructure through cyber
advancements in new technologies. This represents an innovative twist on
empowering innovators through government intervention on national
cybersecurity innovation policy.75
A few, modern-day and developing technological examples reflect many
of the characteristics of national cybersecurity innovations. These technologies
have different attributes and definitions yet share a common characteristic of
ensuring security through interconnections between data and devices.76 These
examples all address substantive national cybersecurity, ranging from
7 See infra Part III and Part IV.
74 See infra Part III.
75 See infra Part IV.
76 See Christian Reuter, Larissa Aldehoff, Thea Riebe & Marc-Andre Kaufhold, IT in Peace,
Conflict, and Security Research, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACE AND SECURIrY 22-24
(Christian Reuter ed., 2019).
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cryptography,77 cyber-physical systems,
78 IoT,79 information security,80 and the
SmartGrid.8 1 A rich technological literature had demonstrated that these new
77 Cryptography refers to embeddable technology that secures information storage,
communication, and transactions through concealment or extraction of concealed information. See
generally Greg Vetter, Information Security and Patents, in HARBORING DATA, supra note 38, at
64, 77, 79 (defining cryptography as "a versatile, foundation technology with wide applicability
[and one that] can hide information in data or implement secure communication" by the use of a
key that serves a translation function); Greg Vetter, Patenting Cryptographic Technology, 84 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 757, 762 (2010) (defining cryptography as "us[ing] a key to convert plaintext to
ciphertext and to reverse the operation when necessary" for the purpose being to "keep everyone
else from accessing the protected data"); Cryptography, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc380/defs
3 8O.htm (last visited Oct. 11,
2020) (describing that this class of technologies includes "equipment and processes which (a)
conceal or obscure intelligible information by transforming such information so as to make the
information unintelligible to a casual or unauthorized recipient, or (b) extract intelligible
information form such a concealed representation, including breaking down of unknown codes and
messages").
78 Cyber-physical systems refer to elements that link between the cyber and physical world
and impact security, integrity, and/or privacy of the information of devices and impact critical
infrastructure. See generally NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., STRATEGIC R&D





Physical%20Systems.pdf (providing as examples of cyber-physical systems as being active
monitoring and control systems, smart grids for water and wastewater, and early warning systems;
providing as corresponding innovative products or applications as being bridges and dams and
municipal water and wastewater treatment); Gupta & Mukherjee, supra note 48, at 138 (suggesting
that cyber-physical systems' elements are actuators and sensors with communication or software
capabilities; providing as examples pertaining to infrastructure as being smart grids, industrial
control systems, intelligent transportation); Amy J. C. Trappey, Charles V. Trappey, Usharani
Hareesh Govindaraj an, John J. Sun et. al., A Review of Technology Standards and Patent Portfolios
for Enabling Cyber-Physical Systems in Advanced Manufacturing, 4 IEEE ACCESS 7356 (2016)
(defining cyber-physical systems as "a collection of transformative technologies for managing
interconnected physical and computational capabilities," through "sensors, data acquisition
systems, and computer networks"); Florian Ernst & Patrick Frische, Industry 4.0/Industrial Internet
of Things-Related Technologies and Requirements for a Successful Digital Transformation: An
Investigation of Manufacturing Businesses Worldwide 8 (2015) (M.S. thesis, University of
Strathclyde), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2698137 (stating cyber-
physical systems are a "combination of IT with mechanical and electronic components connected
to online networks that allow machine-to-machine communication in a similar way to social
networks").
7 IoT refers to interconnected devices networked together with computers for data collection
and exchange, and more specifically Industrial IoT refers to IoT applied to industrial uses. See
generally IGOR MIKOLIC-TORREIRA, RYAN HENRY, DON SNYDER, SINA BEAGHLEY ET. AL., A
FRAMEwORK FOR EXPLORING CYBERSECURITY POLICY OPTIONS xii (2016); SANDRA WACHTER,
NORMATIVE CHALLENGES OF IDENTIFICATION IN THE INTERNET OF THINGS (Elsevier Ltd. ed. 2018)
(defining the IoT as "objects [that] can be equipped with identifying, sensing, networking and
processing capabilities that will allow them to communicate with one another and with other
devices and services over the Internet," and furthermore, "objects embedded with RFID tags,
allowing for unique identification and monitoring of object movement and consumption"); Adam
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national cybersecurity innovations are utilized in applications such as Industrial
Control Systems ("ICS")" 2 and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
("SCADA"),83 which interact with critical infrastructure. The biggest challenges
towards ensuring critical infrastructure include fostering national cybersecurity
innovation and integrating the resulting advanced technologies into the critical
infrastructure.84
Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security
Concerns without Derailing Innovation, RICHMOND J.L. & TECH. 8 (2015) (describing the IoT as
being machine-to-machine connectivity and communication that enables computers to observe,
identify, and understand the world without limitations of human-entered data and increasingly
through wireless technologies and protocols; further quoting Morrision Foerster analysts as
defining the IoT as "the network of everyday physical objects which surround us and that are
increasingly being embedded with technology to enable those objects to collect and transmit data
about their use and surroundings"); William H. Dutton, The Internet of Things 8-11 (2013)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=2324902; Ernst &
Frische, supra note 78, at 11 (referring to the Industrial IoT as "connect[ing] the physical world
with the virtual world" for industrial transformation of power distribution, manufacturing, wind,
rail, mining, oil and gas, power generation).
80 Information security is a broad term that refers to securing hardware, software, and physical
locations from threats. See generally Whitman & Mattord, supra note 54, at n.3.
8 The SmartGrid refers to modernization of the electricity grid with computer hardware and
software. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 17381 (West 2020) (characterizing the Smart Grid as having
"increased use of digital information and controls technology to improve reliability, security, and
efficiency of the electric grid"); NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 14, at 4
(describing the smart grid as involving electricity infrastructure that is characterized by "(1)
increased use of digital information and controls technology to improve reliability, security, and
efficiency of the electric grid. (2) dynamic optimization of grid operations and resources"); Joel B.
Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff Removing Barriers to Innovation on the Smart Grid,
61 UCLA L. REv. 1712, 1719, 1721 (2014) (suggesting that the Smart Grid "consist[s] of
improvements to the old [electricity] infrastructure, such as deployment of smart meters and digital
technology across the existing network"; also suggesting that "data gathered by smart meters may
well create a 'big data' ecosystem").
82 KEITH STOUFFER, SuzANNE LIGHTMAN, VICTORIA PILLITTERI, MARSHALL ABRAMS ET AL.,
NAT'L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUB. NO.
800-82 REV. 2, GUIDE TO INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICS) SECURITY 1, 1 (2015),
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf (stating that "ICS are
found in many industries such as electric, water and wastewater, oil and natural gas, chemical,
pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, automotive, aerospace, and durable goods"
and includes SCADA systems).
83 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, 21 STEPS TO IMPROVE CYBER SECURITY OF SCADA NETWORKS 2
(2005), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/21_Steps-
SCADA.pdf (describing SCADA networks as "contain[ing] computers and applications that
perform key functions in providing essential services and commodities (e.g., electricity, natural
gas, gasoline, water, waste treatment, transportation) [and are] potentially vulnerable to disruption
of service, process redirection, or manipulation of operational data that could result in public safety
concerns and/or serious disruptions to the nation's critical infrastructure).
84 Lee, supra note 5.
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B. The Problem, The Need, & Preparedness
National cybersecurity is one of the most pressing domestic policy issues
in the U.S. today.85 While the new coronavirus has caused a crisis, a malicious
cyber-attack could cause the next crisis-one that would spread faster than a
biological virus and with greater economic impact.
86 The U.S. has come to
recognize that cyber-insecurity could cripple the nation's security, economic
structure, public health and safety, or any combination thereof.
87 The U.S. is
dangerously cyber insecure and is facing a catastrophic cyber-attack that requires
greater investment preparation.8 8 The economic impact of cyber-attacks is about
6% of the U.S. GDP, or over $ 1 trillion dollars.89 Cyber-attacks against critical
infrastructure would result in high damage to the U.S. economy and generate
spillovers to the wider economy.90 Without adequate national cybersecurity,
connected devices, communication networks, and electricity grids are vulnerable
to being hacked at an unprecedented scale.91
85 RAUL KIKK, NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY INDEX (2018), https:/ega.ee/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/ncsidigital smaller.pdf; NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY FRAMEwORK
MANUAL (Alexander Klimburg ed., 2012); Klon Kitchen, A Major Threat o Our Economy-Three
Cyber Trends the U.S. Must Address To Protect Itself HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 2, 2019),
https://www.heritage.org/cybersecurity/commentary/major-threat-our-economy-three-cyber-
trends-the-us-must-address-protect.
86 This includes widespread disruption, fundamental shifts in the way we live our lives, an
extremely challenging recovery ahead, and a growing uncertainty about the stability of the U.S.
economy from the shutdown. Most readers may think the most likely cause of the crisis that fits
this description would be COVID-19. Instead, prior to the start of 2020, many policymakers would
have considered the cause to be a cybersecurity incident. While the new coronavirus has caused a
crisis, a malicious cyberattack could cause the next crisis-one that would spread faster than a
biological virus and with greater economic impact.
87 Eldar Haber & Tal Zarsky, Cybersecurity for Infrastructure: A Critical Analysis, 44 FLA.
STATE U. L. REv. 515, 519 (2017); Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S.
Policy?, 215 J.L., TECH. & POL'Y 341, 345, 349 (2015) (specifying "grave danger and potential
consequences of cyberattack[s]" and noting that there are "many entry points for attackers to find
vulnerabilities" such that there is "an arms race between attackers and defenders").
88 U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM'N, supra note 12.
89 JOHN GILLIGAN, AFCEA INT'L CYBER COMM., THE ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY 1
(2013), https://www.afcea.org/committees/cyber/documents/cybereconfinal.pdf.
90 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, THE COST OF MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY TO THE U.S.
ECONOMY 1 (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/The-Cost-of-
Malicious-Cyber-Activity-to-the-U.S.-Economy.pdf.
91 PUB. SAFETY CANADA, NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY: CANADA'S VISION FOR




Cyber-attacks are inevitable.92 Cyber-risk is considered a major concern
for society and is getting exponentially worse.93 Resilient cybersecurity would
thwart bad actors from unlawfully and maliciously disabling, intruding on, or
otherwise impeding the use of computers and networks that protect cyber-based
and physical assets of critical infrastructure.94 However, underinvestment in
cybersecurity technology has made U.S. critical infrastructure woefully cyber-
insecure.95 Cybersecurity of the software, hardware, and the cloud that is
92 KARINE BANNELIER & THEODORE CHRISTAKIS, CYBER-ATrACKS 7 (2017) (defining cyber-
attacks as "malicious acts against, inter alia, vital infrastructure of [the United] States [that]
threaten[s] critical infrastructure"); CHESNEY, supra note 39, at 3 (describing a cyber-attack as
"using cyber capabilities directly to disrupt the capabilities an adversary would need [through]
access, disrupt[ion], manipulate[ion], or damage [to] a system in an unauthorized way");
SHACKELFORD, supra note 27, at xix (stating that "[a] serious cyber attack may disrupt critical
networks, damage 'military command or information systems,' and interrupt 'electrical power ...
or . .. financial services.' Or, in a worst-case scenario, cyber attacks could trigger satellites to spin
out of control, power grids to crash, economies to collapse, and societies-deprived of basic
services-to begin to self-destruct"); Dan Assaf, Government Intervention in Information
Infrastructure Protection, in CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 31, 34 (E. Goetz & S. Shenio,
eds., 2008) (describing the use of information warfare through the application of information
technology having a debilitating impact on a power grid or a communication network, such that a
disruption leads to cascading failures, which would lead to a failure of practically every critical
infrastructure due to cyber-interdependency of an infrastructure's operability relying on its
information systems); Matwyshyn, supra note 19, at 1121-23 (giving as an example of a cyber-
attack being the use of malware to "compromis[e] networks of personal computers, consumer
smartphone, and even Internet of Things (IoT) webcams [that] can easily be remotely repurposed
for attacking critical national assets such as stock exchanges, dams, or power grids [and] vulnerable
critical infrastructure systems [such as] smart grids, power and water stations, air traffic control
systems, and other communication systems, health systems, and nuclear power plants-all blend
private and public-sector elements").
93 Jay P. Kesan & Linfeng Zhang, Analysis of Cyber Incident Categories Based on Losses,
ACM TRANS. MANAG. INFORM. SYST. (forthcoming 2020).
94 Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5195c(e) (West 2020)
(defining critical infrastructure as "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the
United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination
of those matters"); CHESNEY, supra note 39, at 81-82 (characterizing critical infrastructure
"provid[ing] the essential services that underpin American society and serve as the backbone of
our nation's economy, security, and health ... [known] as the power we use in our homes, the
water we drink, the transportation that moves us, the stores we shop in, and the communication
systems we rely on to stay in touch with friends and family"; further listing distinct sectors of
critical infrastructure as being: chemical sector, commercial facilities sector, communications
sector, critical manufacturing sector, dams sector, defense industrial base sector, emergency
services sector, energy sector, financial services sector, food and agriculture sector, government
facilities sector, healthcare and public health sector, information technology sector, nuclear
reactors/materials/waste sector, transportation systems sector, water and wastewater systems
sector).
95 RICHARD HARRISON & TREY HERR, CYBER INSECURITY (2016); INT'L TELECOMM. UNION,
supra note 16 ("Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security
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connected to networks requires research and development of defensive
countermeasures.96 The nation should not fall victim to being caught off guard
by another threat that could cause a severe crisis, and one response is to foster
the development of adequate national cybersecurity of critical infrastructure.
97
The U.S. critical infrastructure and computer networks have been built
with vulnerable technologies designed with easy access-whether licit or
illicit-that are in need of improvement. Cybersecurity forms the backbone of
the information age and technological improvements, including developing
better products, reducing the porous structure and vulnerabilities of unsecured
network systems, replacing legal systems, and improving reliability.
98 Existing
national cybersecurity technologies may be limited or not working and render
critical infrastructure vulnerable to attack.
99 Cyber-attackers are constantly
devising new technologies for launching cyber-attacks.
100 The U.S. struggles to
address the changing character of cyber threats, lacks a clear cybersecurity
response mechanism, and faces gaps in cyber deterrence of new technological
safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance
and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user
assets. Organization and user assets include connected computing devices, personnel,
infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunication systems, and the totality of transmitted
and/or stored information in the cyber environment. Cybersecurity strives to ensure that the
attainment and maintenance of the security properties of the organization and user's assets against
relevant security risks in the cyber environment."); U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM'N, supra
note 12; Finnemore, supra note 15, at 431 (defining cybersecurity as "the protection of information
and communication technologies from unauthorized access and attempted access"); Barrie Sander,
Cyber Insecurity and The Politics of International Law, 6 ESIL REFLECTIONS 1, 1, 8 (2017).
96 I define "cybersecurity" throughout this Article as encompassing technology, such as
information and communication technology, that permits resilience of critical infrastructure and a
state of being secure from cyber-attacks. In other words, "cybersecurity" means "cybersecurity
technology" for the purposes of this Article, which focuses on "national cybersecurity" (not solely
"corporate cybersecurity"). For a discussion that is solely on "corporate cybersecurity," see
generally HARBORING DATA, supra note 38.
97 I define "national cybersecurity" as cybersecurity applicable for critical infrastructure.
Given that the choice of governing arrangement-whether a government provision, private
provision, or any combination thereof-is essential to ensuring critical infrastructure protection, a
distinction between "national cybersecurity" and "corporate cybersecurity" is warranted and
acknowledges the reasons for the ability of the private sector to provide adequate incentives for
technological innovation to protect against cyber-attacks. See generally Matwyshyn, supra note
19, at 1113, 1119, 1120-23 (differentiating corporate cybersecurity and national cybersecurity, but
recognizing that they are reciprocal and inextricably interwoven).
98 Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 Nw. U. L. REv. 1503, 1503 (2013).
99 JOHN R. VACCA, CYBER SECURITY AND IT INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 121 (Elsevier
Science 2013).
l SCOTT A. WEED, U.S. POLICY RESPONSE TO CYBER ATTACK ON SCADA SYSTEMS




development.101 In order to respond to technological advances being developed
by adversaries, the U.S. should proactively develop and incorporate
breakthrough and incremental national cybersecurity technologies to protect its
critical infrastructure.0 2 There is a national need for innovation and evolution of
cybersecurity technological capabilities,103 which are a porous structure of legacy
and unsecured systems.
Cyber-attacks have risen exponentially in recent decades and have impacted
the critical infrastructure, producing devastating effects on society.104 Increased
data connectivity, quick expansion of cyber-physical systems, and the on-going
development of artificial intelligence and new technologies in the cybersecurity
field have all contributed to an increased frequency and magnitude of cyber-
attacks.05 These same forces are predicted to erupt in the foreseeable future with
potentially catastrophic effects on critical infrastructure.10 6 The Department of
Homeland Security has estimated that in the short run a cyber-attack is likely to
result in catastrophic damage to industrial control systems, which would
jeopardize electricity, energy, transportation, and water networks.107
Against this backdrop, national cybersecurity systems are faced with
insurmountable challenges in anticipating and proactively addressing future
cyber-attacks with preparedness.108 Chief among these challenges is the fact that
101 U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM'N, supra note 12, at 14, 17, 27-28, 36-39, 71, 75, 82,
84, 88.
102 DIV. OF NAT'L INTEL., NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 5, 21
(2019), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/NationalIntelligenceStrategy_2019.pdf;
Mullane, supra note 13 (suggesting that cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructure would
jeopardize transport systems, supply of fresh water, communications, banking, power plants,
national railway and local underground systems, other forms of public transport, and electricity to
hospitals, homes, schools and factories).
103 NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY, VERSION 1.1 20 (2018),
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf; James Kaplan, Chris
Toomey & Adam Tyra, Critical Resilience: Adapting Infrastructure To Repel Cyberthreats,
MCKINSEY & CO. (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-
infrastructure/our-insights/critical-resilience-adapting-infrastructure-to-repel-cyberthreats#.
104 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY 2 (2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS-Cybersecurity-Strategyl .pdf.
105 Tabrez Y. Ebrahim, Artificial Intelligence in Cyber Peace in CYBER PEACE: CHARTING A
PATH TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE, STABLE, AND SECURE CYBERSPACE (Cambridge Univ. Press)
(forthcoming 2021).
106 Rebecca Moore, Expansion of Technology Will Increase Cyber Security Threats,
PLANSPONSOR (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.plansponsor.com/expansion-technology-will-
increase-cyber-security-threats/.
107 WEED, supra note 100, at 3-7.
108 COMM'N ON ENHANCING NAT'L CYBERSECURITY, REPORT ON SECURING AND GROWING THE
DIGITAL ECONOMY 2-3 (2016),
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cyber-attacks remain inherently unpredictable, and the U.S. is cyber-insecure and
underprepared to respond to upcoming cyber-attacks.
09 One strategy to help
reduce the severity and scale of advanced persistent threats and their impact on
the cyber-physical system is centered on innovation mechanisms for the
development of national cybersecurity to provide information assurance,
vulnerability management, and critical infrastructure protection.
110 Innovation
policy should promote and direct R&D of national cybersecurity towards
architecture, defense, intelligence, and offense measures in computing and
information technologies. In some cases, national cybersecurity measures are
urgently necessary, and in other cases, they are needed as soon as possible.
However, national cybersecurity development in this context faces hurdles that
vastly surpass the unpredictability of cyber-attacks and insufficient level of
R&D.
When approached through a specific lens (such as in the case of this Article,
which focuses on innovation mechanisms), the development of national
cybersecurity innovation necessitates fostering targeted technological
development. Such innovation can occur through government-oriented and
market-oriented approaches," as well as at different paces.
1 2 A more
appropriate calibration of innovation policy is critically needed for national
cybersecurity, and a failure to do so may come at a heavy cost for society.
This Article thus advocates for an expanded focus on the multifaceted roles
of innovation mechanisms in national cybersecurity development to better suit
the critical infrastructure needs that are prone to cyber-attacks. While providing
a theoretical foundation based on public-private goods"
3 and on property-
liability rules,1 4 this Article seeks to describe innovation mechanisms and their




109 Hathaway & Klimburg, supra note 41, at 4, 8.
110 DIV. OF NAT'L INTEL., supra note 102.
u1 See infra Part III.
112 For example, short term objectives could prompt incentives to fix security in software code
that may address immediate vulnerabilities; long term objectives could prompt incentive to develop
integration among cyber and physical system to enable resilience, safety, and scalability, as well
as integration of artificial intelligence and new technologies, to prevent gradual or catastrophic
destruction.
Given multiple paces of technological development necessary to protect critical
infrastructure against cyber-attack, innovation mechanisms may play another role, with licensing
of technology. Thus, innovation mechanisms may have effects on multiple time horizons and
multiple ways in which they can shape a response to national cybersecurity development o protect
against cyber-attacks and point to different paths forward.
113 See infra Section III.A.l.
114 See infra Section III.A.2.




A theoretical foundation to national cybersecurity innovation seeks to align
legal incentives and innovation inducement mechanisms with socially optimal
level of security for critical infrastructure. National cybersecurity innovation
requires establishing whether government intervention or the market should
foster its technological development.11 6 But conflicts have to be resolved
between the society's interest in cybersecurity as a public good and the individual
interests of inventors and innovators.
National cybersecurity's biggest problem stems from a policy failure to
balance market-based incentives with government intervention, and society must
consider that, "given the significance of the private sector in [national
cybersecurity] settings, structuring incentives properly is critical [and] the
benefits of any government intervention must be weighed against the costs of
ineffective or excessively costly interventions." 7 The core problem is that
protection of the critical infrastructure should benefit all, but the government
must rely on the private sector to provide national cybersecurity, even though it
has little incentive to do so. As such, determining whether and to what level
national cybersecurity can be considered a public good and how the law can
influence the behavior of actors for innovation can serve as a guidepost for
normative implications, prescriptions, and innovation policy.
This Part compares and contrasts national cybersecurity innovation
within patent law's conception of legally protectable technologies as public
goods with cybersecurity law and policy's conception of public goods. The
objective of this Part is to lay out the theoretical foundations and justifications
for: (1) arguing against extending patent protection further for national
cybersecurity innovation; and (2) arguing for considering national cybersecurity
as a public good in order to provide the basis for alternative innovation
mechanisms.
A. Patent Law's Conception & Taking of National Cybersecurity
Much is at stake in determining whether the patent system can be
reformulated to promote national cybersecurity innovation since computer
116 Daniel R. McCarthy, Privatizing Political Authority: Cybersecurity, Public-Private
Partnerships, and the Reproduction ofLiberal Political Order, 6 POL. & GOVERNANCE 5, 8 (2018).
117 Peter R. Orszag, Critical Infrastructure Protection and the Private Sector: The Crucial Role
of Incentives, BROOKINGS (Sept. 4, 2003), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/critical-
infrastructure-protection-and-the-private-sector-the-crucial-role-of-incentives/ (stating, "[w]e
must therefore alter the structure of incentives so that market forces are directed towards reducing
the costs of providing a given level of security for the nation, instead of providing a lower level of
security than is warranted."; furthermore, while describing how "private markets by themselves do
not generate sufficient incentives for homeland security" through seven reasons, also suggesting
the need for government intervention").
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networks and cyber-physical systems increasingly impact communication
networks, dams, electrical grids, pipelines, and transportation. Critical
infrastructure will function better when the federal government integrates its
efforts with those of the private sector, and the patent system reflects that
concept.
Drawing upon economic theory, this Section aims to bring to the
forefront that patent law's conception of innovation deviates sharply from
national cybersecurity technological development needs. The patent system's
goal of encouraging innovation, which occurs through a quid pro quo exchange
of the legal right to exclude for an inventor's full disclosure of the invention,"'
breaks down for national cybersecurity technologies. The legal basis for the
restriction of information from the public secretly and steadily due to concerns
of national security has negative implications.1
9 Thus, this Section argues that
patent law's unique policy mechanism of encouraging disclosure as a social
contract metaphor leads to a distorted conception of the innovative process that
it seems to promote for national cybersecurity.
The patent system enables market-based incentives to promote
technological innovation and views innovation through the lens of exclusive
rights." 0 By attributing temporary exclusionary rights, the patent system is meant
to enhance the prospect of appropriating economic returns on investments in
inventive activities."' However, exclusive rights produce deadweight loss
122 and
perhaps result in a decrease in public-sector innovations. Economic-based
rationales suggest that a patent would provide temporary monopoly rights over
the technological development that is awarded but would also lead to a
corresponding deadweight loss.123 Thus, a market-based framework for driving
national cybersecurity innovation may not adequately address the needs of
critical infrastructure development.
118 See generally Jay P. Kesan, Economic Rationale for the Patent System in the Current
Context, 22 GEO. MASON L. REv. 897, 898 (2015) (examining several theories that explain and
justify the role of patents in the modem economy, including traditional ex ante justifications and
ex post justifications, as well as how these economic rationales may differ across industries).
119 Amanda Fitzsimmons, National Security or Unnecessary Secrecy? Restricting Exemption 1
To Prohibit Reclassification of Information in the Public Domain, 4 J.L. & POL'Y INFO. SOC'Y 479,
479-80 (2008).
120 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-2 (West 2020).
121 Liliane Hilaire-Perez, Christine MacLeod & Alessandro Nuvolari, Innovation Without
Patents, 64 REVENUE ECONOMIQUE JANVIER 5 (2013).
122 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 16-21 (Harvard Univ. Press ed. 2003).
123 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 301-03 (9th ed. 2014).
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1. Public Goods in the Patent Context
National cybersecurity technologies, like other patentable technologies,
should qualify as public goods.124 The technical knowledge embedded within
ICT is a public good since it is both nonrival (multiple parties can use it without
diminishing its availability)125 and nonexcludable (absent legal intervention, it is
nearly impossible to exclude others from appropriation).126 Essentially, these
national cybersecurity technologies are knowledge assets, and as such, are
theoretically capable of inexhaustible appropriability.127 Economic theory holds
that competitive markets will produce a suboptimal level of new technologies
since free riders will appropriate such assets, leading to diminished incentives to
invent unless and until a patent system provides legal rights to exclude others.128
Thus, the patent system mitigates market failure by enhancing the incentive to
invent, and in the absence of the patent system, the inventions would exhibit
public good attributes.129 In effect, a patent is a legal right on a public good.
Moreover, absent patent law, an inventor that develops a better technology
cannot prevent others from copying it without paying royalties. In sum, an
inventor will put in effort into invention by recognizing the potential for reaping
rewards in prices that approach the social value of the invention.
The foregoing analysis applies reasonably well to most technologies, but
national cybersecurity innovation, however, adds another twist. While national
cybersecurity technologies share these public good attributes,130 they entail
different challenges for underproduction in comparison to other technologies.
Exclusive patent rights play different roles in motivation of the invention of
national cybersecurity technologies. There are substantive differences between
innovation of other technological domains and the patent framework for national
cybersecurity technologies. Because national cybersecurity innovation produces
significant positive externalities by reducing threats to critical infrastructure and
to national security beyond the implementing inventor or firm,131 inventors do
124 See infra Section III.B.1 and Section HI.C.
125 R. A. Musgrave, Provision for Social Goods, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS 124, 126-29 (Julius
Margolis & Henri Guitton eds., St. Martin's Press 1969).
126 Corinne Langinier & GianCarlo Moschini, The Economics of Patents: An Overview 2 (Iowa
State Univ., Working Paper No. 335, 2002).
127 Kesan, supra note 118, at 897, 898-99.
128 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
285 (1977).
129 Langinier & Moschini, supra note 126.
130 Nicola Jentzsch, State-of-the-Art of the Economics of Cyber Security and Privacy, 4
IPACSO 1, 24 (2016).
1 Allen Friedman, Economic andPolicy Frameworks for Cybersecurity Risks, CTR. FOR TECH.
INNOVATION AT . BROOKINGs (July 21, 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/0721 _cybersecurity_friedman.pdf.
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not face adequate incentives. 
12 Thus, national cybersecurity innovation faces
another type of market failure, one which is based on its positive externalities
since its salutary effects are gained by members of society, far beyond the
inventor or firm that implements the invention. Framed another way, national
cybersecurity innovation has significant benefits beyond those received by the
consumer.
Technological advancement in national cybersecurity provides benefits
to the cost of national security, thwarts catastrophic failure of electricity grids
and communication networks, and protects public health and safety.
133 Thus,
there are significant, potential welfare gains as both industry and the general
public could be made significantly better off by national cybersecurity
innovation. Similar to the impact of technological innovation on the environment
and for public health, innovators' incentives are not in accord with the social
value of the innovation unless the public benefits are internalized in some
fashion. A rational profit-maximizing inventor or firm will not develop and
implement a national cybersecurity innovation unless it expects to benefit from
it in some manner and to benefit from it in a greater amount than the cost of
research, development, and implementation.
34 In general, an inventor or firm
considering whether to invest into national cybersecurity innovation will not take
into account the benefit that society reaps from the innovation in the form of
improved critical infrastructure conditions but only accounts for the benefit that
the inventor or firm itself will receive in the marketplace.
Because inventors and firms do not consider the full social benefits of
implementing national cybersecurity innovation, they do not face socially
optimal incentives to invent under the patent system. Thus, the patent system is
not significantly successful in driving national cybersecurity innovation. United
States patent law offers certain, limited opportunities to promote technological
innovation that has national cybersecurity benefits but, ironically, opposes the
aims of the patent system. There is a limited subset of national cybersecurity
technologies that has a connection with patent law. Technologies pertaining to
132 Jentzsch, supra note 130, at 7 (specifying cybersecurity amplifies network externalities).
133 President Donald J. Trump Is Strengthening America's Cybersecurity, WHITE HOUSE (Sept.
20, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-is-
strengthening-americas-cybersecurity/.
134 MARKET FORCES AND GOVERNMENT ACTION IN SECURING CYBERSPACE PRELIMINARY
REPORT 7, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacyfiles/files/media/csis/pubs/001213_cybersecmarketforces_govt.pdf (last visited
Oct. 11, 2020) (describing that, to the extent that critical infrastructure is a public good, then there
is less reason for the market to invest into it).
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information security are classified as Class 726135 and cryptography are classified
as Class 380136 at the United States Patent & Trademark Office ("USPTO").
To clarify why patent law does not adequately incentivize national
cybersecurity innovation, it is useful to describe the conceptual limitation of a
compulsory license (that creates eminent domain power) and provide support
under a theoretical framework. Understanding the patent system's inefficiencies
with national cybersecurity innovation provides guidance as to other innovation
mechanisms in order to provide socially optimal results.
2. Property-Liability Rules Theoretical Framework for Patents
A theoretical framework for predicting and explaining how property and
liability rules influence the behavior in legal actors is useful in understanding the
role and limitations of the patent system,137 including for national cybersecurity
innovation. Drawing from the Calabresi-Melamed typology towards a new
application of patents for national cybersecurity technology has not been
addressed in scholarship and would provide a way to analyze virtues and vices
for protecting legal entitlements to promote economic efficiency and social
welfare. An extension of this framework to an unaddressed field sheds new
theoretical insights promoting national cybersecurity innovation.
As a theoretical framework, Calabresi-Melamed property-liability
typology denies the holder of the asset the power to exclude others and allows
the third party to keep the asset and objectively determine the value of it.'3 8 The
owner of the asset must accept the value, and as a consequence, society benefits
from the resources available to it for a particular technological field, whereas the
owner of the asset accepts the uncertainty of the objectively determined value.139
The normative insight from the Calabresi-Melamed property-liability rules
135 Information Security, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc726/defs726.htm (last visited Oct. 16,
2020) (describing that this class of technologies includes "a computer or digital data processing
system, for processes or apparatus for increasing a system's extension of protection of system
hardware, software, or data from maliciously caused destruction, unauthorized modification, or
unauthorized disclosure").
136 Cryptography, supra note 77 (describing that this class of technologies includes "equipment
and processes which (a) conceal or obscure intelligible information by transforming such
information so as to make the information unintelligible to a casual or unauthorized recipient, or
(b) extract intelligible information form such a concealed representation, including breaking down
of unknown codes and messages").
137 Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Patents: One
Experimental View of the Cathedral, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 138, 143 (2011).
13 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1108 (1972).
139 Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 1293, 1302-04 (1996).
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framework is that the choice of rules in a next context should be based on the
degree of transaction costs.14
0 In distinguishing between various types of
transaction costs, liability rules are favored when voluntary bargaining is not
expected and transaction costs are high, whereas property rules are favored when
parties can cost-effectively bargain with each other and transaction costs are
low.'141
Liability rules, which are known as "take-any-pay" regimes, allow an
option for a third party to take an entitlement and pay that entitlement owner
some price.142 By contrast, property rules would require obtaining permission
from the right's owner and would necessitate transaction costs associated with
the bargaining and licensing process.14 3 Under a system of liability rules,
however, a third party would be able to take a technology, thereby eliminating
the need to negotiate a license and lowering the transaction cost by reducing the
bargaining process to determine a value of the entitlement.
The field of patent law has gradually shifted away from property rules
and towards liability rules.14 4 Liability rules in patent law allow for the
government to take a technology and provide a government-run reward. As such,
a liability rule (such as eminent domain power in the form of compulsory
licensing) frustrates the goal of incentivizing innovation through the patent
system.145
3. Suppressing National Cybersecurity Inventions by Eminent Domain
The framework for a liability rule is embedded in patent law and arises
under the Invention Secrecy and 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which are forms of eminent
domain for patented inventions.146 These exemptions to patent protection for
government based public interest provides for a government-run reward system
for which the state offers to pay monetary award.'
47
140 Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 100 CALIF. L. REv. 463, 466 (2012).
141 Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovksy, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1, 37 (2002).
142 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 138.
143 Ana Santos Rustchman, The Vaccine Race in the 21st Century, 61 ARIZ. L. REv. 729, 765
(2019).
144 eBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006); Dan L. Burk, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Molecular Futures: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Cathedral, in
GENE PATENTS AND LEARNING MODELS: FROM CONCEPTS TO CASES (Geertrui van Overawlie ed.,
2009).
145 Scott F. Kieff, Patents for Environmentalists, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 307, 314 (2002)
(arguing that a liability rule, such as compulsory licensing, for patent law would frustrate the goals
of incentivizing innovation).
146 28 U.S.C.A § 1498 (West 2020); 35 U.S.C.A. § 181.
147 Gary L. Hausken, The Value of a Secret: Compensation for Imposition of Secrecy Orders
Under the Invention Secrecy Act, 119 MiL. L. REv. 201, 203 (1988); Joel Dodge, The Government
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In the U.S., the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution expressly reserves
the right of the federal government to take personal property from private
individuals for public use, provided that the individual receive just compensation
for such a taking.14 8 Eminent domain powers of the government have increased
with time,14 9 with more uses being considered for public benefits, including in
patent law.150 In technological domains where eminent domain powers are
applicable, the patent system is converted from an incentive-centric, market-
based system to a reward system that provides a reasonable royalty."' The
government can revoke a patent right and force the inventor to share its invention
under compulsory licensing.1 2 United States patent law provides for compulsory
licensing for specialized subject matter and certain circumstances wherein a
government entity can use the inventor's patent without the inventor's consent.5 3
Thus, the government has statutory authority for compulsory licensing on patents
for non-voluntary use of patented inventions."1 4 These licenses limit the scope of
what may be patentable and can involve inventions that are vital to the public
interest, such as for national defense or public health and welfare.5 5 Such
compulsory licensing of inventions is deemed a type of eminent domain, wherein
the government must compensate the inventor of the patent.156 Two main forms
of compulsory licensing are relevant for national cybersecurity-invention
secrecy and government patent use.
Under the Invention Secrecy Act, inventors cannot receive patents on
inventions that pose national security risks.157 Whenever publication or
Can Legally Commandeer Drug Patents, PEOPLE'S POL'Y REP. (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/2017/10/02/the-government-can-legally-commandeer-
drug-patents/ (describing that under government patent use, the federal government must provide
reasonable compensation to the patent holder for legally commandeering the patented product).
148 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (elaborating on the "Takings Clause," which allows the
government o take property if just compensation is provided).
149 Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Legal Claims as Private Property: Implications for Eminent
Domain, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 373-423 (2009).
150 Michael Abramowicz, Cost-Plus Patent Damages, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 719, 761-62,
772, 775 (2016).
151 Hausken, supra note 147, at 201, 203, 228-31.
152 Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 666, 667-68 (1988).
153 CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43266, COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS 6 (2014)
(defining compulsory license as the grant of permission for an enterprise seeking to use another's
patent without the consent of the inventor, wherein the grant of the compulsory license requires
sanction of a government entity and provides compensation to the patent owner).
154 Statutory Authority for Compulsory Licenses of Patents in the United States, KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INT'L, https://www.keionline.org/cl/statutory-authority-us (last visited Oct. 16, 2020).
155 Fauver, supra note 152, at 668, 670.
156 CONG. RsCH. SERV., supra note 153, at 9.
157 35 U.S.C.A. § 181 (West 2020).
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disclosure of an invention may be detrimental to national interests (such as
national security), the government can determine that the invention be kept
secret.15 8 The result is that the inventor is notified that the patent application will
not continue in the patent prosecution process and is withheld from being granted
a patent for a period required for national interests.15 9 The USPTO has the power
to flag patent applications for review by government agencies, which could
request certain inventions be kept secret under a secrecy order.
160 USPTO
officials weigh the government's national security interests against the inventor's
exclusion rights of the invention.16' The leaderships of a government agency,
such as the Secretary of Defense or chief officer of another government
department or agency, can order the UPSTO to maintain the patent application
in a sealed condition, through a secrecy order, if they determine that it could
jeopardize national interest.6 2 Such a secrecy order provides the government
with the right to exploit an invention in a patent application and constitutes a
taking by the government.163
The inventor whose patent application is held under a secrecy order has
the right to apply for compensation based on damage caused by the secrecy
order.1" Thus, inventors who seek inventions that are deemed important to
national interests (such as national security), however, may receive a patent
reward.165 The reward is set by a Patent Compensation Board, based in part upon
the actual use and importance of the invention.166 If a full settlement of the
compensation cannot be determined, then the government can provide to the
inventor "a sum not exceeding 75 per centrum of the sum which the head of the
department or agency considers just compensation for the damage and/or use,"
or alternatively, the inventor can bring suit against the U.S. in the Court of
Federal Claims.167
151 Arvind Dilawar, The U.S. Government's Secret Inventions, SLAT (May 9, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/05/the-thousands-of-secret-patents-that-the-u-s-govermment-
refuses-to-make-public.html.
159 35 U.S.C.A. § 181.
160 CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32051, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN
HOMELAND SECURITY 15 (2008).
161 GEOFFREY MCGOVERN, MARIA MCCOLLESTER, DOUGLAS C. LIGOR, SHENG TAO LI ET. AL.,
THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY 21 (2019).
162 Hausken, supra note 147, at 201, 203, 228-31.
163 Id
164 35 U.S.C.A. § 183.
165 Hausken, supra note 147, at 243-47.
166 Id
167 Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 39 n.3 (2d Cir. 1958).
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Patent applications that are subject to invention secrecy have steadily
increased.168 According to reported statistics, an average of 117 secrecy orders
have been imposed annually since passage of the 1952 Invention Secrecy Act,
and 5,784 inventions have been under secrecy orders as of 2018.169 While the
number of secrecy orders remained constant from 1952 to 1979, since 1979 the
number of active secrecy orders has steadily increased-a trend that has received
attention from scholars, Congress, and courts.170 Yet scholars have commented
that such statistics are suspect, since the entire process is secret and invention
secrecy has been overused.171 While the aim of invention secrecy is to protect
national interests, "[a]t best, government agencies err on the side of caution and
impose secrecy orders on patents that present even the slightest threat... . At
worse, bureaucrats mindlessly impose secrecy orders and then forget about them,
because that's simpler than carefully considering the implications of new
technologies becoming public."1 72
Additionally, government patent use of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 presents
another form of eminent domain power by the government for patents.173 Under
28 U.S.C. § 1498, the government can use a patent at any time without
permission of the patent holder, so long as the inventor is provided reasonable
compensation for the government's use of the patent.174 This form of compulsory
licensing is justified on the ground that it increases public access to inventions
when there are governmental concerns about a lack of adequate supply and
public interest.77 This statute allows federal agencies and third party government
contractors to manufacture and use the patented invention without authorization
and without obligation of prior negotiation from the patent holder, whose only
source of redress is the Court of Federal Claims.176




169 Dilawar, supra note 158.
170 Hausken, supra note 147, at 202-03.
171 Dilawar, supra note 158 (stating that "with so many inventions deemed secret, so few
eventually publicized, and the entire process itself obfuscated in classification, it's no wonder that
critics have questioned whether the current invention-secrecy regime is really working").
172 Id
173 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498 (West 2020).
174 Hannah Brennan, Amy Kapczynski, Christine H. Monahan & Zain Rizvi, A Prescription
for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH.
275, 279-80, 299 (2016).
175 Fauver, supra note 152, at 668, 671.
176 Judge Mary Ellen Coster Williams & Diane E. Ghrist, Intellectual Property Suits in the
United States Court of Federal Claims, U.S. CT. FED. CLAIMS (Nov. 4, 2017),
https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/node/2927.
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The inventor whose patent is commandeered by the government under
28 U.S.C. § 1498 is entitled to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.177
The patent holder is paid a "reasonable compensation," which is usually 10% of
sales or less178-a standard that is vague, and also non-applicable when there are
not yet any sales. There are three methods to ascertain "reasonable
compensation": (1) reasonable royalty of a license; (2) lost profits and (3) savings
to the government.1 9 The government can effectively force the compulsory
licensing of the patented inventions for its own use. However, where negotiations
over the value of the license fail, the government may still use the patented
invention. In effect, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 results in a takings claim by the patent
owner, and a court must fix the value of the patent.180 Some scholars have argued
that government patent use can be beneficial over other policy tools for a speedy
response to some national emergency situations.181 In particular, government
patent use has been a strategy that has been suggested by scholars to promote
pharmaceutical innovation and provide a response to a public health crisis.
82
177 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498.
178 35 U.S.C.A. § 183.
179 Lionel M. Lavenue, Patent Infringement Against the United States and Government
Contractors Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 in the United States Court of Federal Claims, 2 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 389, 423 (1995).
180 Brennan et al., supra note 174, at 311.
181 See generally Christopher J. Morten & Charles Duan, Who's Afraid of Section 1498? A Case
for Government Patent Use in Pandemics and Other National Crisis, YALE J.L. & TECH.
(forthcoming 2020) (suggesting that government patent use provides speed, flexibility, ex post
remedy determination, and impartial adjudication to the COVID-19 national emergency).
182 While scholars have argued that government patent use under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 may not
undermine incentives to innovate in pharmaceuticals and for vaccines, and could result in net
economic and healthcare gains, it may not be as effective for national cybersecurity (where it could
be problematic). These perspectives consider that government patent use increase access to life-
saving medicines and address the high cost of drugs caused by monopolistic pricing, but do not
necessarily address innovation. Thus, the theoretical defense to government patent use under 28
U.S.C. § 1498 for commandeering inventions is based on access and efficiency caused by pricing,
and not inadequacy in government or market driven motivations to promote innovation.
These features of liability regimes render them especially apt at a time of a prolonged crisis,
in particular for a severe pandemic outbreak of an infectious disease, such as COVID-19. In such
cases, the patent system present barriers to rapid R&D necessary to achieve a vaccine cure, and a
liability regime would remove the barrier by facilitating compulsory licensing. However, such a
feature would not apply to national cybersecurity where a disruption, even while catastrophic, is
not biological but instead is caused by hardware and software. Unlike the race to find a cure for
COVID-19, where the patent system imposes impediments over a relatively prolonged time period
(estimated at optimistically 12-18 months, albeit intense R&D) to find a cure, a national
cybersecurity breach would require a hardware and/or software solution (or a cyber-physical
system) that would be a fix or repair. Thus, unlike vaccine R&D, where a take-and-pay liability
regime would ease the R&D pathway after a crisis, a take-and-pay liability regime with national
cybersecurity would not ease reduction of a crisis that could be solved with a technological fix. In
other words, government patent use under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498, which may aid R&D in some
[Vol. 123518
NATIONAL CYBERSECURITYINNOVA TION
The framework for a liability rule is embedded in government patent use
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which is a form of eminent domain for patented
inventions and provides for a government-run reward system for which the state
offers to pay monetary award.183 It gives the federal government the right to use
patented inventions without permission, while paying the patent holder a
"reasonable and entire compensation."84 As such, it operates as a form of
government immunity from patent rights, where patent holders can demand
royalties but cannot stop the government from producing the invention or
allowing others to do so.185
A liability regime is not desirable for all types of innovation, such as
with national cybersecurity. Furthermore, a liability regime specific for certain
types of technology presents challenges for delineating technology specific
boundaries and for political economy. This Article takes the position that a
liability regime would hamper national cybersecurity R&D following a cyber-
attack, and also, the current system of government patent use under
28 U.S.C. § 1498 (a type of liability regime) is a barrier to national cybersecurity
development even absent a catastrophic crisis.186
Consider as examples for government patent use under 28 U.S.C. § 1498
for non-biological technologies in the defense technology field. While a defense
related technology is not necessarily within the characterization of national
cybersecurity for this Article, it represents an example of the government
commandeering a hardware-software technology. In the example of night-vision
goggles, the patent owner sued the federal government under government patent
(under 28 U.S.C. § 1498) for "reasonable and entire" compensation based on
direct infringement by the government.187 In the example of lead free bullets (or
green bullets), the patent owner sued the U.S., and the Department of Defense
invoked government patent use.188 Thus, these examples demonstrated that
technological domains such pharmaceuticals and vaccines, does not advance R&D of national
cybersecurity.
183 Amy Kapczynski & Aaron S. Keeselheim, Why "Government Patent Use" To Lower Drug
Costs Would Stifle Innovation, HEALTH AFFS. (July 28, 2016),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160728.055969/full/.
184 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498 (West 2020).
185 Dennis Crouch, Can the US. Government Infringe a US. Patent? (The US. Government
Says It's Impossible), PATENLYO (Sept. 20, 2015),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/09/government-infringe-impossible.html.
186 See supra Section III.A.3.
187 Philip A. Janquart, Night-Vision Goggles Spat Resolves for $75 Million, COURTHOUSE NEWS
(Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.courthousenews.com/night-vision-goggle-spat-resolved-for-75-
million/.
188 Stew Magnuson, Ammunition Inventor Wins $15 Million Patent Infringement Case Against
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government patent use is a remedy for the patentee ex post of issuance and not
an ex ante incentive, similar to pharmaceuticals and vaccines.
The current application of government patent use of 28 U.S.C. § 1498
for national cybersecurity related inventions has not adequately incentivized
innovation. This statute, which is a form of liability rule under the Calabresi-
Melamed property-liability typology,189 is optimal to utilize when transaction
costs are high or in a field where transactions are infeasible. Instead, alternative
incentive mechanisms would yield more promising avenues for national
cybersecurity development.
4. Limitations with Patent Rewards Based on Eminent Domain
A patent rewards system attempts to capture the social returns of
innovation that are generally not reflected in the market.190 The primary difficulty
with a patent rewards system for inventions that are suppressed from disclosure
under the Invention Secrecy Act, is that an administrative body has to determine
the value of the invention.191 The identification of the social value of an invention
is not an easy task. There are criticisms leveled against such patent rewards in
general.
First and foremost, a patent rewards system for inventions suppressed
under the Invention Secrecy Act fails to result in commercialization of the
inventions. The market for national cybersecurity innovations is the government
or defense sector, and as such, this market does not provide adequate incentives
for the adoption of such innovation.
Second, a patent rewards system for inventions suppressed under the
Invention Secrecy Act is expensive to administer. There are costs with
administration of the Patent Compensation Board and with resources spent in
calculating the social value of the innovation. Furthermore, there is the cost of
the reward itself. Determining the exact social value of an invention is a near
impossible task that would require calculating how society benefits from the
particular national cybersecurity innovation. This calculation would require
determining secondary effects, such as the impact of the innovation on future
inventive activity in the same technological domain, effect of multiple inventive
efforts at various stages of the invention, and distortions in national cybersecurity
caused by the grant of the reward.
Third, the amount of the reward is based on pricing of the social value
of the invention and not simply on the marginal cost. Furthermore, the patent
could be found to be invalid in post-issuance proceedings or in district courts had
189 See supra Section III.A.2.
190 Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanisms for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 1137, 1141 (1998).
191 Hausken, supra note 147, at 234.
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there not been such a reward, and therefore, some rewards could be provided for
patents that should have been deemed unworthy of the patent system as invalid
patents.
These difficulties with a patent rewards system for inventions
suppressed under the Invention Secrecy Act suggest that inventors have no ex
ante knowledge of how their national cybersecurity invention will be treated and
valued in this system. The lack of accuracy in valuing the invention and the high
cost of administration of such a reward suggest that such a system is not adequate
for incentives to national cybersecurity innovation.
B. Public Goods Characterization, Market Failure, & Government Failure
Public goods refer to a good that is both non-excludable and non-
rivalrous, such that individuals cannot be excluded from use or could benefit
from it without paying for it and where use by one individual does not reduce
availability to others or the good can be used simultaneously by more than one
person.19 2 The notion of public goods in the patent context refers to the
knowledge embedded within a technology that is nonrival and nonexcludable,
and as such, the knowledge asset is capable of being inexhaustibly appropriable,
wherein the patent system mitigates the free rider problem.193 The notion of
public goods in the cybersecurity context refers to a social good (or a collective
good), which is non-excludable and non-rivalrous, such as national security, for
which it applies to all citizens in a society that live under its protection (not just
those who paid for it).
1. Public Goods in the National Cybersecurity Context
Is national cybersecurity a public good in the economic sense? At first
glance, it would appear to be the case since national cybersecurity should be
made available to society and there appears to be no buyer except the
government, government agencies, or government contractors.194 A deeper
analysis reveals, however, that such a characterization is not so simple, and there
is more subtlety to whether national cybersecurity is a purely public good.
National cybersecurity reveals an idiosyncratic nature of public goods in
the social good context. One of the primary requirements for a public good (in
the social good context) is that one's consumption of the good does not reduce
the consumption left for another person.195 In other words, public goods are made
192 See generally HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS (W.W. Norton & Co. ed. 1992).
193 See supra Section III.A.1.
194 A number of government services are considered public goods, which includes public
health, fire department services, and national defense.
195 Joseph B. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J.
1693, 1699-1700 (2008).
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available to everyone in society and the end product or service has only one
customer-the government.196 Public goods have two defining characteristics,
that they are nonexcludable and nonrivalrous.197
Scholars have debated how to define the public good nature with regards
to national cybersecurity.198 The majority of scholars consider national
cybersecurity a public good that should be provided by the U.S. government to
the population.199 However, a minority of scholars suggest that national
cybersecurity is not a single public good, but it is a bundle of public goods and
private goods that are networked with a cyber infrastructure owned mostly by
private entities.200
Some scholars have argued that since ICT and data (that is increasingly
part of national cybersecurity) are inherently commercial and operate as an
196 Nish Acharya, COVID-19 Reminds Us Why Innovation Is Often a Public Good, FORBES:
ENTREPRENEURS (Mar. 23, 2020, 1:31 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nishacharya/2020/03/23/covid-19-reminds-us-why-innovation-is-
often-a-public-good/#637818681 f7e.
197 The first characteristic of a public good is that it is nonexcludable, which means it is costly
or impossible to exclude someone from using the good. More specifically, a public good cannot
apply to everyone and exclude one member of society. The second characteristic of a public good
is that it is nonrivalrous, which means when one member of society uses it, another can also use it.
See Christopher S. Yoo, Public Good Economics and Standard Essential Patents 4 (Univ. Pa., Inst.
for L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 14-27, 2014).
198 Peter M. Shane, Cybersecurity: Toward a Meaningful Policy Framework, 90 Tx. L. REV.
87, 95 (2012).
199 John J. Chung, Critical Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Market Failure, 96 OR. L. REV.
441, 453 (2018) (stating that "[n]ational security (which cybersecurity protection of [critical
infrastructure]) is a public good"); Deirde K. Mulligan & Fred B. Schneider, Doctrine for
Cybersecurity, 140 J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & Sci. 70, 80 (2011) (stating "[o]ur doctrine of public
cybersecurity is rooted in the thesis that cybersecurity is a public good"; furthermore, suggesting
that "[clybersecurity is non-rivalrous and non-excludable so, by defmition, it is a public good");
Benjamin Powell, Is Cybersecurity a Public Good? Evidence from the Financial Services Industry
2 (Indep. Inst., Working Paper No. 57, 2001) (stating that "cybersecurity is often assumed to be a
'public good' that will be underprovided or fail to be provided at all in the private market"); Peter
Magemeso, Cyber Security a Public Good, INST. FORENSICS & ICT SEC. (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://www.forensicsinstitute.org/cyber-security-a-public-good/.
200 Rosenzweig, supra note 17, at 8-9 (stating, "[i]t is commonplace to note that private entities
own and operate 85-90% of the cyber infrastructure"; furthermore, suggesting that "[s]ecurity in
cyberspace is a market good [and that] security in cyberspace is not a singular good-rather it is a
bundle of various goods, some of which operate independently and others of which act only in
combination.... Given the vast scope of cybersecurity goods, it is no surprise that different aspects
of the bundle may be provided by different sources . .. cybersecurity is, to a very large degree, a
private good, adequately provided by the private sector."); Assaf, supra note 92, at 29-32 (stating
that "most critical infrastructure assets are owned and operated by the private sector"; furthermore,
recognizing "interdependencies between the public and private sectors" while pointing out that
"cyber security is considered to be a public good, although not a pure public good. It has strong
public good characteristics [but] it is not considered to be a pure public good because it is, at least
to some extent, excludable").
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interaction between individuals and firms, national cybersecurity cannot be
considered a purely public good. This perspective suggests that national
cybersecurity's reliance on the private sector indicates that it is a market good.201
Another perspective has argued that national cybersecurity can be
characterized as a purely public good.202 This viewpoint suggests that some
elements of national cybersecurity can fairly be characterized as public goods,
and remaining elements are either private goods with externalities that present
challenges for government regulation or are co-mingled public-private goods
that equally present challenges for private sector incentives.203 This view
considers national cybersecurity as not purely a public good, but instead a co-
mingled public and private good. National cybersecurity has a dual nature of
public and private goods that introduce externalities that point to different
government and market policy solutions.
While some form of government or a government organization is the
sole customer of public goods, private companies can contribute towards
producing public goods, although private companies may fmd it difficult to
produce them.204 A free rider problem arises, such that people have an incentive
to let others pay for the public good while benefiting from the purchases of
others.205 A key issue in paying for public goods is to find a way for everyone to
make a contribution and prevent free riders. Relatedly, another important issue
is how to provide for and incentivize the creation of the public good-this may
be done via government or via markets.206
This analysis poses two countervailing considerations in the national
cybersecurity economics discourse-the free rider problem and continued
investment into corporate cybersecurity by the private sector. First, since
individuals and firms want to benefit from others' efforts to develop and pay for
national cybersecurity innovation, they fail to deal with the problem of national
cybersecurity themselves. Firms and individuals hope to benefit from another
firm's development of a national cybersecurity innovation and also fail to report
data breaches as they arise, with the result that firms may not innovate as quickly
201 Rosenzweig, supra note 17, at 8; James Pattison, From Defence to Offence: The Ethics of
Private Cybersecurity, 5 EuR. J. INT'L SEC. 233, 244 (2020).
202 Mischa Hansel, Cyber Security Governance and the Theory of Public Goods, E-ITN'L RELS.
(June 27, 2013), https://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/27/cyber-security-governance-and-the-theory-of-
public-goods/.
203 Kosseff, supra note 26, at 995; Shane, supra note 198, at 95; Tyler Moore, The Economics
of Cybersecurity: Principles and Policy Options, 3 INT'L J. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROT. 110-
11(2010).
204 Powell, supra note 199.
205 Chung, supra note 199, at 445-46.
206 See infra Part IV.
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as they should.2 07 As a result, the private sector underinvests in cybersecurity due
to negative externalities, positive externalities, and free riding.
208 Second, the
private sector has continued to invest dollars into cybersecurity-largely
corporate cybersecurity-development to protect against cyber-attack, which
impacts national cybersecurity.209 Thus, there must be enough of a private return
to cause firms to invest so much into cybersecurity, and as a result national
cybersecurity may not have a purely public characteristic. Given that the private
sector owns about 85-90% of the critical infrastructure in the U.S., innovations
in corporate cybersecurity have positive effects in national cybersecurity.
2 10
However, many firms are not adequately investing into corporate cybersecurity,
which is a growing priority among most companies.21 Against this backdrop,
and in assessing whether national cybersecurity is a public good, the relevant
deeper question is whether private businesses on their own accord will provide
adequate national cybersecurity or if some form of government involvement is
necessary.2 12
2. Market Failure and Role of Government
The effect of the countervailing forces of the free rider problem and
continued investment into corporate cybersecurity does not produce sufficient
national cybersecurity.213 While there may be some innovation in national
cybersecurity, it may not be quick enough both in the short term or the long term.
Markets may not provide sufficient national cybersecurity, resulting in a classic
market failure that necessitates government involvement through some
207 Shana Kayne Beach, Usable Cybersecurity: Human Factors in Cybersecurity Education
Curricula, 1 NAT'L CYBERSECURITY INST. J. 4, 10 (2014) (describing that with "the current
misalignment of incentives, asymmetries, and externalities of the traditional security-based
approaches, [if] the costs of insecurity are borne by others in the network, there is limited incentive
to increase security").
208 Chung, supra note 199, at 441, 476, 455 (explaining that a free rider problem occurs when
an individual enjoys as much of the public good as someone who pays for it); Sales, supra note 98,
at 1507-08, 1519-20 (describing that positive externalities happen when an activity generates
benefits that an actor cannot internalize, and negative externalities occur when an activity imposes
costs on others that are not transmitted through prices).
209 Trautman, supra note 4, at 355-58.
210 Sales, supra note 98, at 1506.
211 Lawrence A. Gordon & Martin P. Loeb, The Economics of Security Investment, 5 ACM
TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. & SYSTEM SEC. 438, 438-39 (2002) (describing inadequate investments
in corporate cybersecurity to reduce data breaches and develop encryption, access control, and
firewalls to protect information).
212 See infra Part IV.
213 Assaf, supra note 92, at 32 (suggesting that government intervention is necessary due to




appropriate innovation mechanisms."' Government intervention is justifiable
when there is some public interest that impacts the relevant societal good."'
According to economic theory, government should seek to correct the
market failure of national cybersecurity that arises due to its public good-like
characteristics. However, even if government intervention helps to correct the
market failure problem, there may still be government failure with over
correction.216 Government regulation could over-correct and overregulate, such
that direct government regulations may not lead to an optimal level of national
cybersecurity, resulting in a government failure.1
National cybersecurity faces market failures, but increased government
efforts may lead to government failures. A balanced approach to national
cybersecurity innovation should seek to provide additional government
intervention to address market failure but remain careful not to over-impose and
lead to government failure. While in a perfect market, the private sector would
develop or purchase adequate cybersecurity technological solutions, indication
of market failure necessitates some form of government intervention.2 18 The
market failure of cybersecurity stems from obstacles including: (1) a lack of
incentives to pay for a public good; (2) high transaction costs; and (3)
government restrictions. These obstacles are interrelated and necessitate a new
approach to fostering cybersecurity innovation.
Consequently, government intervention is necessary since the private
sector will not pay for a public good as long as someone else does.219 Because
the market by itself does not provide sufficient incentives for optimal resources
towards cybersecurity, the private sector will not bear the full costs of its
vulnerabilities.22 0 As a result, the private sector has weaker incentives to secure
its cybersecurity technological systems.221 Thus, the market by itself does not
provide sufficient incentives for optimal resources towards national
cybersecurity. The problem is compounded by the government's reliance on the
214 Alain Marciano & Steven G. Medema, Market Failure in Context, HMST. POL. ECON. (2015).
215 J. Janewa OseiTutu, Private Rights for the Public Good?, SMU L. Rev. 767, 807 (2013).
216 Eli Dourado & Jerry Brito, Is There a Cybersecurity Market Failure?, (Geo. Mason Univ.,
Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No. 12-05, 2012).
217 CLIFFORD WINSTON, GOVERNMENT FAILURE VERSUS MARKET FAILURE (2006).
218 MARKET FORCES AND GOVERNMENT ACTION IN SECURING CYBERSPACE PRELIMINARY
REPORT, supra note 134.
219 Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M. Salzberger, The Effects of Cyberspace on the Economic Theory
of the State, 2004 LAw, ECON. & CYBERSPACE 144, 146.
220 Haber & Zarsky, supra note 87, at 515, 543-44 (noting that the market alone is insufficient
to ward off cybersecurity risks since private sector critical infrastructure owners do not have
sufficient incentives, thereby leading to insufficient cybersecurity protection).
221 Mariarosaria Taddeo & Francesca Bosco, We Must Treat Cybersecurity as a Public Good:
Here's Why, WORLD ECON. F. (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/08/we-
must-treat-cybersecurity-like-public-good/.
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private sector to develop technologies to provide cybersecurity technology even
if there is little economic incentive to do so.
22 2 Since market forces will not
naturally provide for adequate cybersecurity, government intervention is
necessary. As with other approaches to increase the development of and
investment into public goods, the government can act as a facilitator to build a
framework for strengthening cybersecurity.
C. Comparing Public Goods in Patent Law & Cybersecurity Policy
National cybersecurity is a "public good," not only because it serves the
public but also because it emanates from a knowledge asset. The patent system
is meant to provide a legal right on public goods."
3 The government has to strike
a complex balance between national cybersecurity public interest concerns and
exempting a legal right on public good inventions concerning national
cybersecurity. Achieving this balance is even more difficult since ICT introduces
more cyber and data connections with the critical infrastructure, which as a
result, has become more of a public interest concern.
224 In the age of expansion
of the critical infrastructure to being increasingly connected with the cyber
domain,2S it is necessary to consider national cybersecurity as a public good.
A similar public goods story applies both in the patent law context and
in the cybersecurity policy context. While national cybersecurity inventions are
subject to eminent domain,2 26 they are also the subject of government interest in
national security technological innovation.22 7 This quality of pluralistic public
goods in national cybersecurity is more evident with a deeper than from a high
level of abstraction. Indeed, national cybersecurity innovation at large, such as
cryptography,228 percolated from government initiatives.
229
In a similar sense, the notion of national cybersecurity also arose from
government interests. At an even more discrete level, national cybersecurity
innovation tends to arise from government interest in protecting the critical
infrastructure.230 Indeed, national cybersecurity innovation itself has been
intrinsically a government-driven initiative to date, largely driven by the
222 Rosenzweig, supra note 17.
223 See supra Section III.A.1.
224 See supra Section II.A.1 and Section II.A.2; Figure 2.B.
225 See supra Section II.A.2; Figure 2.B.
226 See supra Section II.B.3.
227 See supra Section III.B.3 and Section III.B.4.
228 See supra Section II.A.2.




Department of Homeland Security.2 3' As such, emphasizing the market-driven
patent system for national cybersecurity innovation is a potentially distorting
innovation mechanism. Public goods are likely to be under-produced if left to the
private market, and markets for public goods will not form.232
The public goods nature of national cybersecurity, which is justified by
economic reasoning,233 contrasts sharply with the market-based conception that
is celebrated by the patent system. Based on its very nature and purpose, patent
law is preoccupied with market-based justifications. In so doing, however, it may
reflect and corroborate a distorted perception of national cybersecurity
innovation dynamics. In fact, much national cybersecurity innovation has arisen
from outside of the patent system. For instance, the National Security Agency
had been the main supporter of digital signatures research relevant for
information security in computer networks.234 Patent law's insistence on
providing a market of inventions that is embodied in goods and services-and
firms themselves-obscures the reality that research, development, and
implementation of some technological domains reveal themselves through
government funding and initiatives.235
In sum, national cybersecurity is a key component for protecting America's
critical infrastructure from risks and entails some elements that are public goods
requiring collective action. To the extent that cybersecurity technology that
protects critical infrastructure is a public good, there is less incentive for the
market to invest in it and a gap with the commercial sector's ability to protect
critical infrastructure.2 36 Market forces are at odds with the public safety and
security needed to promote resilience to cyber-attack vulnerabilities.237 There is
a cybersecurity risk gap between protecting national infrastructure and the
adequacy of technology to address it. 2 38
231 COMM'N ON ENHANCING NAT'L CYBERSECURITY, supra note 108; National Cybersecurity
and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, H. R. 3696, 113th Cong. (2014).
232 Bell & Parchomovksy, supra note 141.
233 See supra Section III.B.
234 See generally NAT'L RSCH. COUNCIL ET AL., CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 227 (Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 1996) (suggesting that the
concepts of cryptography were developed at universities with federal research support).
235 See generally Daniel F. Spulber, How Patents Provide the Foundation of Markets for
Inventions, J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 271 (2015) (developing a framework that demonstrates
patents provide a foundation of the market of inventions).
236 MARKET FORCES AND GOVERNMENT ACTION IN SECURING CYBERSPACE PRELIMINARY
REPORT, supra note 134.
237 See supra Section III.A and Section III.B.2.
238 Haber & Zarsky, supra note 87, at 515; U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 72;
NATIONAL CYBER STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 70.
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IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS & PRESCRIPTIONS
Turning from the descriptive to the normative and prescriptive, this Part
draws from the prior analysis to propose various strategies for accelerating
national cybersecurity innovation. In so doing, it fills a gap in the cybersecurity
literature, which overwhelmingly focuses on maintaining technology resilience
with traditional information assurance,
239 rather than incentivizing innovation.
This Article's examination of innovation mechanisms for incentivizing
national cybersecurity intersects with a long-standing normative debate over
what innovation policies promote research and development of innovative
technologies. The optimal innovation policy-whether patents,
240 prizes,241
grants,2 42 or R&D tax credits
243-are normatively preferable in certain contexts.
Some scholars have argued in favor of market-based mechanisms,
244 whereas
other scholars prefer government-driven initiatives
24s (or via so called public
finance2 46). The U.S. government and private fins alike want innovative
technological solutions to detect, prevent, and provide responses to future cyber-
attacks, and in so doing, protect our nation's security, economic structure, and
public health and safety.247
239 See Herr & Ormes, supra note 45, at 3 (suggesting that the goal of cybersecurity in the
technological community is information assurance, or maintenance of integrity, reliability, and
availability of data and equipment and minimization of the risk of compromise).
240 See generally Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 337 (2008); Steven P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of
Property Rights in Information: Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives 
To
Generate Information, and the Alternative of a Government-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM
INTEL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301 (1998); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN.
L. REv. 341 (2010); Spulber, supra note 235.
241 Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI.
L. REv. 999 (2014); Ted M. Sichelman, Patents, Prizes, and Property, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 279
(2017).
242 W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2019).
243 Charles Dehnotte, The Case Against Tax Subsidies in Innovation Policy, 48 FLA. STATE U.
L. REv. (forthcoming 2021); Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patent-
Prizes Debate, 92 TEx. L. REv. 303 (2013).
244 See generally Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 240; Calandrillo, supra note 240;
Sichelman, supra note 240; Spulber, supra note 235.
245 Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. STATE U. L. REV.
623, 629-30 (2012); Peter Lee, Towards a Distributive Agenda for U.S. Patent Law, 55 Hous. 
L.
REv. 321 (2017); Peter Lee, Social Innovation, 92 WASH. U. L. REv. 1 (2014).
246 Camilla A. Hrdy, Innovation or Jobs: An Inconvenient Truth About Public Financing for
Innovation, 3 J.L. & INNOVATION 69 (2020).
247 Ebrahim, supra note 105; Bannelier & Christakis, supra note 92; Amanda N. Craig, Scott
J. Shackelford & Janine S. Hiller, Proactive: Cybersecurity: A Comparative Industry and
Regulatory Analysis, 52 AM. Bus. L.J. 721, (2015) (providing a survey of private sector proactive
cybersecurity practices, including auditing, data mining, detection systems, analytics, testing, virus
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Accordingly, this Part builds upon a rich body of scholarship comparing the
relative merits of exclusive rights with patents, public funding, prizes, and other
inducement mechanisms to promote national cybersecurity innovation.248 It
addresses the following questions. First, when should society utilize certain
innovation mechanisms to incentivize national cybersecurity development and
how should it allocate the corresponding costs? Second, what is the optimal
innovation policy mix, and what multiple incentive mechanisms should be
utilized in combination? Indeed, not only have these questions gone unanswered,
but with few exceptions, they have gone unasked in cybersecurity scholarship.
These analyses, moreover, provide a framework for selecting one or several of
the mechanisms to promote particular kinds of breakthrough national
cybersecurity innovation.2 49 Innovation mechanisms, such as basic research at
universities, applied research and commercialization non-profit organizations,
small business innovation funding, and public subsidies (research grants and tax
incentives), have some benefits, but this Article argues that national
cybersecurity innovation is best achieved via government intervention through
prizes and CRADAs. This Part argues against extending patents to national
cybersecurity innovation too far, and instead, it argues that selection of prizes25 0
and close public and private interactions25 can each accelerate national
cybersecurity innovation.
A. Normative Implications of Various Innovation Mechanisms
The fundamental principle for incentivizing national cybersecurity is to bring
incentives to develop socially useful results in line with critical infrastructure
needs. Various innovation mechanisms exist to encourage the production of new
trends, consulting, case management, compliance, training, insider threats, mobile security,
honeypots, and patching); Vignesh Ramachandran, Cybersecurity and Patent Law-Let's Work
Together, 10 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 1 (2019).
248 See, e.g., Brett Frischman, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking of the Economics of U.S.
Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347 (2000); Hemel & Ouellete, supra note 243;
Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How To Get Beyond Intellectual Property
Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970 (2012); Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of
Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1902 (2013); Stiglitz, supra note 195;
Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts,
73 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1983).
249 Seegenerally JERRY SCHAUFELD, COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION (Apress 2015) (describing
how to turn ideas from research and development laboratories, universities, patent offices, and
inventors into commercially successful products and services).
250 See infra Section IV.C.I.
251 See infra Section IV.C.2.
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knowledge and technological innovation.252 Society should want technological
solutions where their development cost is less than their societal value, and some
sort of incentive mechanism should serve that purpose.
There are numerous mechanisms for incentivizing the research and
development of innovative technologies, such as cybersecurity for critical
infrastructure. The choice among innovation mechanisms depends upon the
model of knowledge creation, and requires assessing a range of policy levers and
institutions that affect the incentives effects.
253 In comparing mechanisms that
spur innovative technology development requires answering three distinct
questions.
(1) Who decides how to spur the innovative activity-a central
planner (i.e., the government) or decentralized actors (i.e., the
market)? (2) When is the reward transferred-before the
outcome of a project is known or only after a project is
successful? (3) Who pays for the reward-all taxpayers, or only
user of any resulting products?
25 4
A number of policies can increase innovation by encouraging the rate of return
for new technology and encouraging its development.
5 5
B. The Limitations of Patents for National Cybersecurity Innovation
One seemingly obvious incentive mechanism candidate for accelerating
national cybersecurity innovation is to extend and promote exclusive rights over
such technological inventions. For a variety of reasons, however, this Article
argues against patents as such a potential incentive policy intervention.
25 6
Exclusive rights in national cybersecurity inventions would not be a prudent
innovation policy instrument, since the societal costs would be high relative to
benefits. Patent law's conception of legally protectable innovation includes
assigning individual exclusive rights in inventions, requiring robust disclosure to
meet statutory patentability requirements, and emphasizing discrete patent
claiming2 57-each of these facets of patents makes patented technologies to be
252 See generally Matthew S. Clancy & GianCarlo Moschini, Incentives for Innovation:
Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 35 APPLIED ECON. PERSPS. & POL'Y 206 (2013)
(discussing the economics of institutions and policies meant to provide incentives for innovation).
253 Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in HANDBOOK OF LAW &
ECONOMICS 1473-1557 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
254 Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 243, at 327.
255 OPENSTAX, How Governments Can Encourage Innovation, in PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS
13.2 (2d ed. 2017).
256 See supra Section III.A.4 and Section IV.B.
257 See generally Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REv. 591 (2008).
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tradable in markets.258 Thus, in the classic profit-driven formulation for
innovation, markets motivate the generation of new technologies and help to
disseminate them in the commercial marketplace, such as through licensing,
mergers, and acquisitions.259 This model, of course, works best for technologies
that are disclosed through quid pro quo, whereupon patent protection for
inventions is attained in exchange for robust disclosure and patented
technologies enter the public domain upon the expiration of the patent.260 This
market-driven model does not work well for innovations with any semblance of
national security concerns, which present risk of government intervention of
some sort and inadequacies with the patent system.
Notwithstanding potential difficulties with patenting national security
inventions, such as those established by the Invention Secrecy Act,261 other
considerations should represent formidable obstacles to societal benefit from
patenting of national cybersecurity technologies. As mentioned, many national
cybersecurity inventions are not strictly patentable since they raise national
security implications and are subject to government secrecy suppression.262 Even
if a national cybersecurity invention might technically meet patentability, it
would likely be subject to government patent use and subject the government to
exemption from patent infringement.263 Further complicating attempts to patent
national cybersecurity is the mysterious nature of the secrecy criteria, which the
USPTO has noted is held under national security.2 64 As previously mentioned,
the patent system is typically not meant to keep innovation secret,265 and in fact
aims to disclose and disseminate inventions to the public through its quid pro
quo.2 66 Unless the practice of the government commandeering national security
inventions is made less secretive (which seems highly unlikely), the Invention
258 Feng Gu & Baruch Lev, Markets in Intangibles: Patent Licensing (N.Y.U., Working Paper
No. 2451/275465, 2001).
259 Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO STATE L.J. 473 (2005).
260 Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor
After Elfred, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1354 (2004).
261 35 U.S.C.A. § 181 (West 2020).
262 Within the United States' Invention Secrecy Act, if an inventor files a patent that may be
detrimental to the national security in the opinion of an interested government agency, then that
inventor will be ordered to keep the invention secret, resulting in withholding the grant of the
patent. See Dilawar, supra note 158 (noting "that, on top of patent being withheld for national
security, 'the criteria is also held under national security"').
263 See supra Section III.A.3.
264 See id.
265 See supra Section III.A.1 and Section III.A.3.
266 See 35 U.S.C.A § 112; John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate
Patent Definiteness and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 611 (2016); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
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Secrecy Act and government patent use will continue to defeat attempts to patent
national cybersecurity inventions.
Even if national cybersecurity inventions were kept patentable,
exclusive rights would not be a prudent innovation policy instrument for
incentivizing them. Patents (in theory) represent an intrinsic tradeoff: they
enhance incentives to invent, but at the expense of providing disclosure to the
public.267 In the context of national cybersecurity inventions, the benefits of
patent protection are nearly nonexistent since they can be commandeered by the
government and the costs of losing patent protection would be highly deleterious
to potential national cybersecurity inventors.
268 On the benefits side, patents
resolve market failures by granting patentees a right to exclude others from using
their inventions, thus shoring up incentives to invent, assuming that, however,
those rights will not be taken by the government.269 Thus, although patents enable
market incentives to incentivize inventors to invent, they do not create market
incentives.270 Ultimately, it is the market demand that drives the generation of
patented technologies.
The patent paradigm fails to translate to national cybersecurity
inventions, for almost by definition, there is relatively little market demand for
such innovations. That is, assuming the government is the main potential
purchaser of national cybersecurity inventions and there is not a private sector
market for them, patenting of national cybersecurity invention would be unlikely
to generate significant revenues, thus defeating incentives for invention.
Additionally, even if exclusive rights provided significant financial return on
national cybersecurity inventions, such incentives are not particularly germane
to them. As noted earlier, the motivations underlying national cybersecurity
inventions are generally economic only when the invention would be known to
advance a corporate cybersecurity interest. In particular, the challenge of
determining whether a cybersecurity innovation benefits only corporate interests
provides ample motivation for society to consider alternative innovation policies
aside from the patent system. Furthermore, profit motives are not the driving
force for creating technological solutions for achieving national cybersecurity.
Moreover, exclusive right on national cybersecurity innovations are
plagued by difficulties of patent enforcements, which is more difficult than other
technologies. National cybersecurity inventions are subject to government patent
use, which allows the government to use patented inventions through a taking of
267 Jay P. Kesan, Economic Rationales for the Patent System in Current Context, 22 GEo.
MASON L. REV. 897, 898-99 (2015).
268 See supra Section III.A.3.
269 Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 UNiv.
CHI. L. REv. 129 (2004).
270 See generally Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 248.
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a patent license.27 1 Even if national cybersecurity inventions were subject to
exclusive rights, patentees would face significant challenges in bringing
enforcement actions against the government,272 which further depresses
incentives to patent national cybersecurity inventions in the first place.
Lastly, the perceived informational benefits of utilizing patents and
markets to allocate resources for national cybersecurity innovation would not
apply and are largely inapposite. A classical argument in favor of patents for
technological development is that market exchanges create price signals that
allocate resources for invention more efficiently than centralized planning.273
While the information efficiency of markets justifies the patent system in many
technological contexts to incentivize research and development, it fares poorly
when the market signals are weak. In the case of national cybersecurity
innovations, their demand does not translate into commensurate market demand
since there are few purchasers (other than government) who value the innovation
and there is risk of government secrecy and eminent domain.
The misalignment of the traditional view of the patent system with an
expansive, modern critical infrastructure can be demonstrated with a graphical
representation in Figure 3. As national cybersecurity technologies have
increasingly connected data to the critical infrastructure, more of the critical
infrastructure is becoming a public good. By contrast, the patent system, which
scholars have commented provides incentives for physical creations, has
remained rooted in providing a market-based innovation mechanism for the
physical world.274 The physicality in the form of the invention, whether by actual
reduction to practice or constructive reduction to practice, suggests that the
patent system historical basis for incentivizing innovation is in the physical
world.275 Commentators have noted that the patent system is ineffective for
software-based and digital inventions, which obfuscate the underlying
innovation and do not promote adequate incentives.276 The misalignment of the
271 Williams & Ghrist, supra note 176 (describing the eminent domain and taking patent license
authority of the U.S. government in allowing an inventor to obtain money damages for the
government's use of patented inventions while at the same time not restricting the government's
use of the invention).
272 See supra Section II.A.3.
273 Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 11-13
(1969).
274 Christopher A. Cotropia, What Is the Invention, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1855, 1897 (2012)
("The incentive-to-invent story assumes patent law will use this contextualized invention and
demands that patent law provide protection for an invention that is both created and eventually
sold to the public.").
275 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Physicalism and Patent Theory, 69 VAND. L. REv. 1543, 1545
(2016).
276 Bronwyn H. Hall & Meagan MacGarvie, The Private Value of Software Patents, 39 RSCH.
POL'Y 994, 1003-05 (2010) (summarizing the critique of information and software patenting,
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proper innovation mechanism, with the changing nature of critical infrastructure,
suggests that another type of innovation mechanism is more appropriate for










Figure 3: Graphical representation of the misalignment of the traditional view
of the patent system with an expansive, modern critical infrastructure
Thus, the benefits of patent protection on national cybersecurity
inventions would be mostly absent, and there would be a significant societal cost.
Exclusive rights for national cybersecurity inventions would produce deadweight
loss, which is deleterious for protection of critical infrastructure. Moreover,
extending patent rights to national cybersecurity too far could even dissuade
would-be inventors of technologies that would protect the critical infrastructure,
resulting in perhaps decreasing national cybersecurity innovation. It appears that
introducing exclusive rights and profit motives for national cybersecurity may
actually undermine efforts to protect the critical infrastructure. For these reasons,
extending exclusive rights to national cybersecurity innovations would be
ineffective and is ill advised for innovation policy.
including being of low quality, lacking adequate prior art, not including source code
implementation, and being vague and broadly worded).
277 See infra Section II.A. and Section IV.B.
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C. The Potential Benefits with Public Finance Initiatives for National
Cybersecurity Innovation
Approaches other than patents provide inducements mechanisms for
promoting national cybersecurity innovation. Government should consider
funding of mechanisms and endeavors that subsidizes national cybersecurity
innovation, which should not be subjected to exclusive rights.278 In this regard, a
public finance strategy that is funded from general tax revenues would promote
national cybersecurity and would reduce the deadweight losses associated with
the patent system.279 In so doing, public finance initiatives that are promoted by
the government should justify national cybersecurity innovation and would
enable knowledge spillovers to foster further future technological advancements
that would otherwise not happen with the patent system.280
National cybersecurity innovation should be subsidized by public funds,
and government should directly fund either prizes or contribute to public and
private mechanisms that foster it. Public funding through government-sponsored
innovation mechanisms for national cybersecurity innovation is more aligned
with the modern critical infrastructure, whereas the patent system's alignment
with the market may have a negative impact. The alignment of government-
sponsored innovation mechanisms with an expansive, modern critical
infrastructure is demonstrated with a graphical representation in Figure 4.281
Government-sponsored mechanisms will have a comparative advantage relative
to markets and the private sector for national cybersecurity innovation, for which
its value is not reflected in market prices. Although public finance of
government-sponsored mechanisms is subject to deficiencies from biases and
278 See supra Section IV.A.
279 Camilla A. Hrdy, Patent Nationally, Innovate Locally, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 1304-
07, 1325-27 (2016).
280 See generally Hrdy, supra note 246.
281 The government-sponsored innovation mechanisms as shown in Figure 4 reflect this
Article's prescriptions of prizes and CRADAs, which are shown as a rectangle to reflect the ability
to span both public and private sectors. Thus, while the figure demonstrates that prizes and
CRADAs, unlike the traditional patent system's reliance on the market, is based on public finance
mechanisms. As such, while prizes and CRADAs have private sector elements, which are
necessary to align with the mostly private sector ownership of critical infrastructure, the emphasis
on the public sector is shown to demonstrate the alignment with the expansive connection of data
and devices of the modern, expansive critical infrastructure (for which greater aspects of it are
considered public goods). Furthermore, it should be noted that prizes and CRADAs can incentivize
innovation in the cyber domain more appropriately than the traditional view of the patent system;
as such, the figure shows that prizes and CRADAs can be structured to incentivize in the cyber
domain (as well as the physical domain) through dotted, vertical arrows (for viewability, the box
representing prizes and CRADAs is drawn in a thin fashion, but the dotted, vertical arrows attached
demonstrate that it is conceptually "taller" than actually shown in the figure).
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political interests,282 the government-driven sphere is in many ways better
situated than the market to define technological innovation priorities in national
cybersecurity.283
Cyber






Figure 4: Graphical representation of greater alignment of public funding
(government-sponsored) innovation mechanisms with an expansive, modern
critical infrastructure
The prescriptions profiled here have several benefits. Government-run
support of national cybersecurity can generate additional financial support from
the private section, and in so doing, amplify, the impact of taxpayer assistance."
Additionally, delegating some of the involvement in the decision making process
to the private in such government-run mechanisms would offer advantages
relative to purely centralized decision making.
There are some limitations to public funding of government-driven
mechanisms for national cybersecurity innovation that are based on public choice
theory. Contrary to the pricing and information distribution efficiencies of
market-based mechanisms, public funding is susceptible to bias and political
interest that favors parties at the expense of efficiency and creation of
bureaucracy.28s Public choice theory suggests that public funding promotes
282 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production
Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZo L. REV. 1437, 1440 (2010).
283 See infra Section IV.A.
284 Sichehnan, supra note 241, at 286.




patronage when a centralized authority is given authority to make broad
investment decisions with limited information. 286 Nonetheless, some of these
biases and information costs can be mitigated with some private sector
participation in decision-making. Furthermore, public funding of government-
driven innovation mechanisms, while unclear what an optimal amount should be,
represents a relatively small portion of other federal funding priorities.287 In sum,
public funding of government-driven mechanisms represents a powerful engine
for promoting national cybersecurity innovation, which should not be subject to
counterproductive regime of exclusive rights with patents.
1. Prizes
Government-sponsored prizes should have significant potential to
promote national cybersecurity innovation. Such prizes encourage innovation by
rewarding innovators that make the fruits of their innovation available to the
public. 288 Notable examples of prizes in the field of cybersecurity include the
Cybersecurity Excellence Awards, CyberSecurity Breakthrough Awards, and the
Cyber Defense Awards. Prizes encourage innovators to achieve a certain
technological objective and only award funds after a satisfactory technological
completion. 289 Such prizes can be designed and administered to achieve a special
need for society.290
Prizes that are awarded on an ex post basis should promote national
cybersecurity innovation by simulating the development of workable
technological solutions.291 The techniques used to win the challenges may
address a variety of national cybersecurity needs, such as active defense
techniques, industrial control system and SCADA protections to vulnerabilities,
and passive defense add-ons to industrial control architectures.292
286 EAMONN BUTLER, PUBLIC CHOICE-A PRIMER 44 (2012); Craig Allen Nard & Andrew P.
Morriss, Constitutionalizing Patents: From Venice to Philadelphia (Case Sch. of L., Working
Paper No. 04-12, 2004).
287 R. ATKINSON, D. CASTRO, S. ANDES, S. EZELL ET AL., INNOVATION POLICY ON A BUDGET 1
(2010); George H. Pike, Access to Federally FundedResearch Back to Congress, 26 LEGAL ISSUES
8 (2009).
288 V.V. Chari, Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, Prizes and Patents: Using Market Signals
To Provide Incentives for Innovation, J. ECON. THEORY 781, 782 (2012).
289 Michael J. Burstein & Fionna E. Murray, Innovation Prizes in Practice and Theory, 29
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 401, 402, 407, 424, 433, 444, 448 (2016).
290 NAT'L SCIENCE FOUND., INNOVATION INDUCEMENT PRIZES (2007).
291 Thomas Kalil, Prizes for Technological Innovation, HAMILTON PROJECT (BROOKINGS INST.
2006), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloadsandlinks/Prizesfor_Tec
hnologicalInnovation.pdf.
292 Lee, supra note 5, at 31-43.
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Scholars and policymakers are increasingly enthusiastic about prizes
since they have a track record of spurring innovation and solving tough
problems.29 3 There should be a resurgence of government-sponsored prizes for
national cybersecurity innovation. Government-sponsored prizes offer several
informational advantages when adequate market incentives do not exist and over
traditional grants.294 Notably, such prizes do not require explanation of how a
technological problem is solved nor do they require identification on an ex ante
basis who would be the best innovator to solve it.
2 95 In so doing, they increase
access to nonparticipants in innovation with new ideas that may not normally
apply for grants or have funds necessary to apply for patents.
2 96
Moreover, since government-sponsored prizes require an innovation to
complete solving of technological problems, they avoid the detrimental effects
of over-promising for grant recipients.
297 Additionally, prizes can simulate
additional private sector investment to augment their cash value, and create a
multiplier effect for society by encouraging additional parallel effects to provide
additional solutions, thereby providing a greater return than the government-
sponsored prize.298
Government-sponsored prizes have some limitations, however, that can
be addressed with appropriate calibration. They require the government
sponsoring entity to determine which innovations to pay for and how much to
spend for the prize through a nonmarket mechanism.
2 99 This could cause
government decision makers to introduce biases with defining the scope of the
technological challenge, in selection of the winner, and the award amount.
300
Additionally, government-sponsored prizes present risk for the participants, who
may only invest significant time or overspend in trying to win a prize but not
achieve success.301 Also, government-sponsored prizes may be duplicative of
293 B. Zorina Khan, Inventing Prizes: A Historical Perspective on Innovation Awards and
Technology Policy 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 21375, 2015).
294 See generally Roin, supra note 241.
295 Kalil, supra note 291, at 6.
296 Id. at 7.
297 Liam Brunt, Josh Lerner & Tom Nicholas, Inducement Prizes and Innovation (Norwegian
Sch. of Econs., Discussion Paper No. 0804-6824, 2011).
298 Jonathan Bays, Tony Goland & Joe Newsum, Using Prizes To Spur Innovation, MCKINSEY
Q. (2009).




300 Reto Hofstetter, Z. John Zhang & Andreas Herrmann, The Hidden Pitfall of Innovation
Prizes, HARv. Bus. REv. (Nov. 27, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/11/the-hidden-pitfall-of-
innovation-prizes.
301 Czerina Patel, Social Innovation Prizes: Who Really Wins, INSIDE OUT,
http://insideoutpaper.org/social-innovation-prizes-who-really-wins/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
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private-sector prizes if not delineated properly, thereby resulting in duplicative
and wasteful effects for society.302 Finally, prizes must be of the right size amount
in order to incentivize innovators and be calibrated towards the proper metric.303
Thus, prizes are best suited for breakthrough and radical national
cybersecurity innovations that take leaps from the current state of the art.304 It
would require calibration of the size of the award to be sufficient to incentivize
the innovative activity.305 As the scholarly literature has suggested, the prize
award can be tied to a measurable technological metric to promote the
appropriate innovative response.306 Government-sponsored prizes have seen a
resurgence in other technological domains, and national cybersecurity
innovation policymakers should pay attention and take action. Such prizes
should provide the necessary speed and agility to provide major technological
innovations to protect the critical infrastructure and rapidly improve cyber
defense.
2. Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs)
National cybersecurity innovation can be accelerated by providing
public-private sector collaboration, such as for example, CRADAs, which can
promote communal public-private interactions that should drive national
cybersecurity innovation.307 Cooperative arrangements between the public and
private sector have been helpful in infrastructure development, such as building
transportation systems, hospitals, and water and sewer systems, and similarly
such interactions can help to develop the critical infrastructure for national
cybersecurity. Relationships between government and the private sector, even
302 B. Zorina Khan, Inventing Prizes: A Historical Perspective on Innovation Awards and
Technology Policy 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 21375, 2015).
303 Heidi Williams, Innovation Inducement Prizes: Connecting Research to Policy, 31 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 767 (2012).
301 See generally Mokter Hossain, Breakthroughs with Competition-Based Innovation: The X
Prize Foundation, J. ORG. DESIGN (2014); Michael Hendrix, The Power of Prizes: Incentivizing
Radical Innovation, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. FOUND.,
https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/power-prizes-incentivizing-radical-innovation-0 (last
visited Oct. 11, 2020).
305 Kwasi Mitchell, Nes Parker, Sahil Joshi, Jesse Goldhammer et al., The Craft of Incentive
Prize Design: Lessons from the Public Sector, DELIOTTE INSIGHTS (June 9, 2014),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/topics/social-impact/the-craft-of-incentive-prize-
design.html.
306 Lee Davis, How Effective Are Prizes as Incentives to Innovation? Evidence From Three
20th Century Contests 5, 7, 18 (May 7, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
https://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/ds2004-1343.pdf).
307 NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., CRITICAL CYBERSECURITY HYGIENE: PATCHING THE
ENTERPRISE (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/building-blocks/patching-
enterprise.
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when driven by government, should matter in national cybersecurity innovation,
since public-private collaboration can create its knowledge spillovers.
308 Public-
private sharing of data and collaboration related to coordinating cyber threats and
mitigation issues can be promoted through R&D in CRADAs.
CRADAs are a government initiated mechanism for formalizing
interactions and partnerships between federally-funded laboratories and the
private industry.309 As a collaborative means to perform research and
development, CRADAs serve as legal contracts that enable federally-funded
laboratories to conduct joint research with private firms.
310 As written
agreements between private companies and a government agency, CRADAs
serve as a mechanism by federal laboratories to engage in collaborative research
with non-federal partners for technology transfer to move government-funded
research and development into the marketplace.
31  In so doing, they operate as a
joint venture between a federal laboratory and the private sector.
312 CRADAs
close the interactions between the public and private research and development
to promote technology transfer and endogenous knowledge spillovers.
3 13 Using
CRADAs should serve the policy and objectives of Congress in promoting
collaboration between commercial and governments concerns by promoting
public-private partnerships and unique private sector use of federal lab
equipment and transfer of scientific information.314 Statutes authorize federal
agencies to enter into licenses and agreements with their CRADA partners to
provide, accept, retain, and use funds, personnel, and service from the
collaborating party.315 As in any government-industry collaboration, contractual
questions require negotiation, including development of intellectual property.
3 16
However, unlike other forms of a federal laboratory sector collaboration,
308 James D. Adams, Eric P. Chiang & Jeffrey L. Jensen, The Influence of Federal Laboratory
R&D on Industrial Research (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7612, 2000).
309 152 U.S.C.A. § 3710 (West 2020).
310 Clovia Hamilton, University Technology Transfer and Economic Development: Proposed
Cooperative Economic Development Agreements Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 36 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 397 (2003).
311 Non-Standard Navy Cooperative Research and Development Agreement between the Naval




312 Nicholas S. Vonortas, U.S. Policy Towards Research Joint Ventures 7, 21 (Nov. 1999)
(unpublished manuscript) (available at https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/155068/1/NDL2
000-014.pdf).
313 Adams et al., supra note 308, at 3.
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CRADAs require cost sharing and an ongoing commitment that necessitates an
intensive interaction.3 17
Not surprisingly, CRADAs often exhibit close relationships among
government and the private sector. In addition to taking into account the needs
and desires of the government and the private sector when commercializing a
technology, CRADAs allow for each to benefit financially.318 There is flexibility
in the CRADA in terms of revenue share, and often, the industry partner can
pursue patents on the innovative technology with the federal laboratory sharing
in royalties.319 Under the statute that authorizes CRADAs, 15 U.S.C. § 3710a,
allow for formalizing mechanisms and partnerships between the federal
government and private industry.3 20
CRADAs have been part of historical development in military
technology and for the national security context, and there should be more
development in the cybersecurity context. One of the reasons that CRADAs are
so important for national cybersecurity innovation is because they involve both
the government and the private sectors.321 This intensive knowledge sharing can
vastly accelerate the transfer and development of a new national cybersecurity
technology that often requires both government and private sector cooperation.322
The knowledge for implementing and integrating a national cybersecurity
technology resides in government, rather than the private sector, since the
government is responsible for maintenance of the critical infrastructure and
national cybersecurity should be a public good.32 3 In the context of national
cybersecurity innovations, for example, the integration of the public and private
technological elements of the critical infrastructure further underscores the
importance of mechanisms by which innovation can best spread.
317 Adams et al., supra note 308, at 3.
318 Arnold Reisman & Aldonoa Cytraus, Institutionalized Technology Transfer in USA: A
Historic Review 21-22 (Aug. 27, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=585364).
319 Everett M. Rogers, Elias G. Carayannis, Kazuo Kurihara & Marcel M. Allbritton,
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) as Technology Transfer
Mechanisms, 28 RSCH. & DEv. MGMT. 79 (1998); Cooperative Research and Development
Agreement, ACQNOTES (May 7, 2020), http://acqnotes.com/acqnote/tasks/cooperative-research-
and-development-agreement.
320 15 U.S.C.A. § 3710(a); How and When To Use a CRADA, NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH,
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/research/research-conducted-at-nimh/collaborations-and-
partnerships/cooperative-and-development-research-agreements/how-and-when-to-use-a-
crada.shtml#when (last visisted Nov. 12, 2020).
321 U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technology Policy, Technology Administration
(Feb. 2000) at 13-5.
322 Rogers et al., supra note 319.
323 See supra Section III.B.1.
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More broadly, the unique nature of national cybersecurity innovation
requires avenues for integration of public sector infrastructure and private sector
elements for their dissemination, particularly compared to the seemingly
objectively discrete technologies promoted by the patent system. As discussed
earlier, most national cybersecurity is not discrete, physical hardware and
software, but instead are embedded devices and Internet of Things that are
susceptible to malicious cyber-attacks.324  Such national cybersecurity
technologies require a significant amount of interaction between cyber and
physical systems that span both public and private sector infrastructure.
32
Indeed, in some cases, national cybersecurity technologies integrate each of
cyber and physical elements, as well as each of public and private sector
elements, and the classification is very difficult to distinguish.
Thus, a mix of government and private interactions can play a powerful
role in enabling national cybersecurity innovation to develop, deploy, and
spread. After all, innovations that necessitate operation on critical infrastructure
can benefit substantially from government policy intervention and support. The
public infrastructure includes an established network of government-controlled
communication systems, dams, electrical grids, and transportation system.
326
Federally funded laboratories can aid in a variety of ways to experiment upon
and test national cybersecurity innovations. Additionally, private sector efforts
can support and formalize manufacturing and deployment resources to promote
integration of national cybersecurity innovations on the critical infrastructure.
In a more concentrated fashion, CRADAs leverage the power of
knowledge exchange between federally-funded laboratories and private sector
resources to promote national cybersecurity innovation.
32 7 The connection and
exchange that drive government and private sector interactions via CRADAs
facilitate rapid dissemination of new knowledge and create knowledge
spillovers.328 CRADAs can provide infrastructure for concentrated collaboration
between government and the private sector, which in turn, can promote national
cybersecurity innovation.3 29 In effect, government-funded and government-
promoted CRADAs serve to provide connections between the government and
private sector to accelerate national cybersecurity innovation.
324 See supra Section II.A.1. and Section II.B.
325 See id.
326 Haber & Zarsky, supra note 87.
327 NIST and NCCoE Use CRADA To Improve Cybersecurity in Healthcare Sector, FED. LABS,
https://federallabs.org/successes/success-stories/nist-and-nccoe-use-crada-to-improve-
cybersecurity-in-healthcare-sector (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
328 James D. Adams, Endogenous R&D Spillovers and Industrial Research Productivity, (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7484, 2000); Adams et al., supra note 308, at 2-3.




D. Normative Implications and Integration of Prizes and CRADAs
Technological innovation is one of many policy mechanisms for
promoting national cybersecurity and responding to cyber-attacks.33 In sum, the
patent system's Invention Secrecy Act and government patent use are ineffective
for incentivizing national security; this Article instead proposes that
policymakers expand prizes and public-private Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements (CRADAs) interactions. This Article has more
precisely delineated the boundary of government intervention and market forces
to argue that the optimal level of incentives for national cybersecurity can be
achieved if: (1) in the short term, the government achieves an exogenously
identified national cybersecurity policy goal that sets the amount of an ex post
prize correctly to incentivize innovators to rapidly develop solutions; and (2) in
the long term, government expands the missions of its federal laboratories in
CRADAs under 15 U.S.C.A. § 3710a to generate more adequate ex ante patent
incentives and ex post patent licensing.
Beyond an innovation mechanism in isolation, sometimes the best
mechanism for promoting innovation is to expand the capabilities of a single
mechanism in isolation through a combination. This Article has presented
generally two contrasting archetypes for incentivizing national cybersecurity
innovation-market-based mechanisms and public finance government-
sponsored initiatives. It has presented the virtue of prizes for accelerating
national cybersecurity innovation,33 1 the virtue of CRADAs in integration public
and private interaction to intensify national cybersecurity innovation, and the
misfit of exclusive rights with the patent system in thwarting cybersecurity
innovation. A central insight is that a combination of CRADAs and prizes can
intensify public-private interactions, which can be accelerated further to yield
technological solutions.
E. Future Directions
This Article introduces the perspective of innovation policy into
cybersecurity law and policy scholarship and observes that greater attention
should be given to the role of government and public-private partnerships in
fostering technological development. The implicit assumption is that patents are
significant in themselves for the technological field of cybersecurity such that
330 See generally U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS (July 2020),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/lS5N7KvjFfxowl9kCnPlOnx7Mah8pKOuG/view (providing
legislative proposals to support the implementation of cyber deterrence and legislative
recommendations).
3 Patric M. Reinbold, How to Get the Most from Your Host: Risks and Rewards of Intellectual
Property Terms in Government Prize Competitions (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
https://ssm.com/abstract=3579679).
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society should pay attention to their role and the need for change in promoting
innovation to protect the critical infrastructure. As noted, the patent system does
not adequately incentivize national cybersecurity innovators, who would be
undercompensated by patent rewards for their inventions that protect critical
infrastructure.
As this Article has shown, the expanding scope of ICT, increasing
number of networked devices, and the interwoven nature of data and physical
facilities, has promoted co-mingled public-private elements to the critical
infrastructure. This Article has introduced a novel and valuable line of inquiry,
which explored the intersection of cybersecurity and patent law to suggest that
technological advancement presents unique challenges if the sole focus is the
patent system, and instead, has proposed that prizes and CRADAs should have
significant beneficial effects on national cybersecurity innovation. While this
Article has introduced a new scholarly discussion about technological innovation
into cybersecurity law and policy, more attention to parsing government needs
versus the private market and also government versus private mechanisms is
necessary. These are related areas of study, and this Article calls for further
examination to elucidate their effects on national cybersecurity innovation.
Future research can pursue those lines of inquiry, and in so doing,
evaluate how to design and deploy optimal prizes and CRADAs. A future
research project that assesses why national cybersecurity inventors are
undercompensated by the government-run reward system may uncover similar
problems that may apply to prizes and CRADAs as well. Future research can
assess whether the patent reward system's undercompensation of national
cybersecurity inventions is caused by uncertainty with the guarantee of the
reward, the size of the reward being too small, or the transaction cost being too
great. By analyzing the perspectives and concerns of national cybersecurity
inventors, such a future research study could provide broader insights about the
evaluation and implementation of prizes and CRADAs aimed at improving
national cybersecurity.
While it is important to understand how to size a prize or how to
implement a CRADA, it is also important to contextualize these proposals within
a broader range of innovation mechanisms for national cybersecurity. Broader
research insights into the role of a new government agency, the role of negative
prizes, and tradeoffs with the choice of trade secrets specifically applicable to
national cybersecurity could spawn new scholarly perspectives on the
intersection of cybersecurity and technological innovation. Furthermore, a future
research project could question whether government should even have a role in
national cybersecurity innovation and also could explore an even more thorough
account of the spillover effects of national cybersecurity focused prizes and
CRADAs onto corporate cybersecurity and into society.
Along these lines, the theoretical and normative contributions of this
Article provide motivation for further examination of the effects of innovation
mechanisms on national cybersecurity. In sum, while it is important to
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understand the complex ways in which innovation impacts national
cybersecurity, it is also important to contextualize these effects within the
broader economic policy considerations that protect the critical infrastructure.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has broken new ground by exploring the underappreciated
phenomena of technological innovation mechanisms in national cybersecurity
law and policy. U.S. government leaders are increasingly aware that protecting
critical infrastructure includes providing innovative national cybersecurity
technology.332 An important question to address is whether government or the
private sector, or a combination thereof, is essential to ensure an adequate level
of cybersecurity.333 A challenge in fostering national cybersecurity is that while
approximately 85% of the U.S. critical infrastructure is owned by the private
sector,334 the government does not impose significant cybersecurity requirements
on the private sector to protect critical infrastructure.335
In order to promote technological development that would benefit the
critical infrastructure, several theoretical insights concerning unifying
characteristics of national cybersecurity technologies and their connections to
critical infrastructure are given. Moreover, the USPTO's restriction in patenting
of some national cybersecurity technologies suppresses disclosure, whereas the
patent system is meant to promote disclosure as part of quid pro quo. As such,
secrecy of certain inventions supports this Article's normative position that a
patent system is inadequate for incentivizing national cybersecurity, which is
better done through prizes and CRADAs. The advancement of national
cybersecurity to address critical infrastructure requires a reevaluation of
innovation institutions for cybersecurity technologies.
The normative vision rooted in this Article for national cybersecurity is
that the current patent system is slow and hampers innovation, whereas prizes
rapidly place an invention into the public domain rapidly without deadweight
losses and reciprocal public-private R&D interactions can recalibrate the patent
bargain. The patent system's inadequacies for national cybersecurity include
government suppression of patent disclosure through invention secrecy
332 Mary Calam, David Chinn, Jonathan Fantini Porter & John Noble, Asking the Right
Questions To Define Government's Role in Cybersecurity, MCKINSEY & CO. (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/asking-the-right-
questions-to-define-governments-role-in-cybersecurity#.
333 See generally DAN ASSAF, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (Eric Goetz & Sujeet
Shenoi eds., 2007).
34 Sales, supra note 98, at 1506.
35 Chung, supra note 199, at 441, 476, 450-51.
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restrictions336 and risk of eventual takings with compulsory licensing under
government patent use337 hampers innovation.
336
337
35 U.S.C.A. § 181 (West 2020).
28 U.S.C.A. § 1498.
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